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Abstract 
The objective of the present paper is to evaluate the potential development impact and any possible 
side effects of remittances in Belarus. 
Our main finding, based on VAR modeling, is that we cannot consider remittances as a driver of 
economic growth in Belarus: their positive influence on GDP growth is not statistically significant. In 
fact, in the next period GDP responds negatively to remittances growth (p-value is 0.005). To some 
extent this may be a result of a productivity decrease conditioned by possible brain-drain effects and 
high employee turnover.  
Remittances appear to be strongly pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP and mildly pro-
cyclical with respect to the GDP of Belarus. Analysis shows that negative influence of remittances on 
GDP is not caused by Dutch disease and inflation: neither exchange rate appreciation nor growth in 
consumer price is induced by remittances. Instead, lagged REER devaluation Granger causes growth 
in remittances inflow (Wald test p-value is 0.051): when in a crisis devaluation takes place in Belarus 
more people go abroad to support their families and more transfers come from abroad.  
There are no reliable micro-data providing information on remittance receivers; nor are there any 
reliable data about the ways remittances are spent by receiving households in Belarus. Nevertheless, 
available statistics and surveys suggest that remittances have only a limited impact in terms of poverty 
reduction. Remittances are only invested in a limited extent, something in line with their relationship 
with GDP. At the same time we can conclude that due to remittances supporting household spending, 
employment remained nearly unchanged, despite an unfavourable economic climate. However, the 
underdeveloped capital market and lack of investments can result in the failure to modernize so that 
capacities can react, in a timely fashion, to demand fueled by remittances. Thus, there is a need for 
effective policies to channel remittances for investment purposes so that they support economic 
growth. Proposed policy recommendations follow. 
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Executive summary 
Migration is a powerful economic force in CIS countries. In 2011 three CIS countries were among the 
world’s top five remittance receivers (as a percentage of GDP): Tajikistan (47%), the Kyrgyz Republic 
(29%) and Moldova (23%). Belarus stands as an interesting CIS case: it is a member of the Union 
State with Russia. Citizens of both states have had the right to work and permanently settle in either 
country since 1999. Free movement of labour within the Common Economic Space with Kazakhstan 
and Russia, launched, 1 January 2012, makes Belarus even more interesting as a study of the impact of 
labour migration for the national economy.  
Remittances play an increasingly significant role in the economies of many countries, as money 
inflows generated by labour migration. They contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, 
helping to finance imports and service foreign debt, thus indirectly financing development. However, 
remittances may also impose unwanted costs on migrant-sending countries. They can cause domestic 
currency appreciation and they can ease pressure on governments to implement necessary reasons for 
correcting existing imbalances. Thus, remittances emerge as an important economic policy issue. 
The objective of the present paper is to evaluate potential development impact and any possible 
side effects of remittances in Belarus. The paper contains the results of the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, extensive study directly addressing the impact of remittances on the Belarusian economy. 
Our results are based on an overview of the empirical literature focused on Belarus and other CIS 
countries and on an analysis of existing aggregate data using VAR methodology. The paper seeks to 
contribute to the existing literature on the CIS region and to push up remittance effects on the policy 
agenda in Belarus.  
While considering the results of the present study one should take into account that data, both on 
labour migration volume and remittances flows in Belarus, are incomplete and consistently poor. To 
make the analysis more useful we give, whenever possible, our own estimates. 
The main characteristics of remittance flows in Belarus 
• According to Belarus balance of payments data the positive gap between inflow and outflow 
of remittances (defined as sum of compensation of employees and personal transfers in 
accordance with the BPM6) has steadily widened in the last ten years: in 2012 the inflows 
over outflows excess reached 1.3% of GDP, while the inflow share accounted for 1.5% of 
GDP. Statistics on personal transfers are based on official banking institution reports, while 
volume of compensation for employees is calculated based on an expert estimate of the 
number of migrants.  
• The structure of remittances inflows and outflows differs significantly. With inflows there is 
above all employees’ compensation, and its share equaled 60% in 2012. The opposite is true 
in the case of outflows. There workers’ remittances prevail, though the share of employees’ 
compensation has been growing since 2005, when it was only 0.6% (12.5% in 2012). The 
unexpectedly high workers’ remittances outflow may be inflated by money transfers to 
intermediaries (physical persons) abroad who then organize goods purchase and send the 
same goods to Belarus (from the USA and China mainly). 
• Until 2011, when Belarus faced an economic crisis, the country had not relied extensively on 
remittance inflows. National Bank data, unsurprisingly, show remittances growing at a rapid 
pace in 2011-2012. The 55% increase in remittances (in dollar terms) reported for Belarus in 
2011 was to our knowledge the largest in the region.  
• Given that 90.2% of labour migrants, according to the 2009 Census work in Russia, it is not 
surprising that Russia dominates in terms of remittance inflows structuring by countries – 
Uladzimir Valetka 
2 CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
more than 57% of remittances came from this country in 2011. Next comes France (6.9%), 
Latvia and the USA (5.3%), Sweden (3.7%) and Kazakhstan (2.4%). According to the data 
for 2012 migrants in Russia send over 75% of remittances. 
• Russia prevails also as a destination country for remittances from Belarus: it absorbed 38.4% 
of the total remittance outflow in 2011, followed by the USA (9.8%), Germany (7.4%), 
China (4%), Belgium (3.8%), Spain (3.3%) and Lithuania (3%). 
• According to the only available survey, conducted in 2003, labour migrants managed to 
resolve a number of their problems such as improvements in housing conditions and the 
purchase of durable consumption goods, good quality clothes and food. For half of the 
respondents labour migration is a way to find funds to invest in education and to pay for 
medical services. Less than one quarter of respondents mentioned helping relatives and 
business-related issues as their motive for migration. Finally, labour migration is a strategy 
for fighting poverty for only 15% of respondents. 
• According to our estimates the number of labour migrants from Belarus working in Russia in 
2011-2012 (130,000-180,000) is 2.5-3.5 times higher than that used by the NBRB for 
employees’ compensation calculation (52,000). Taking into account Russia’s share in total 
remittances inflows (57.2%) we estimate that average remittances inflows to Belarus from 
Russia are 1.9-2.4 times higher than those recorded in terms of balance of payments. Using 
this rough estimate we can approximately assess the size of the remittances inflow for 
Belarusian GDP in 2011-2012 at 2.8-3.6%.  
Development and side effects of remittances 
• Remittance inflows are strongly pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP. Remittances rise 
with the growing income of migrants and of temporary workers who increase in number 
when Russian GDP grows. Remittances appear to be slightly pro-cyclical with respect to 
Belarusian GDP. Macroeconomic shocks do not appear to have a persistent effect on 
remittances, which tend eventually to stabilize at their original levels. This may indicate that 
remittances per se are more a concomitant result of the economic system. This would reflect 
some fundamental characteristics of labour market institutions, rather than being a by-
product of temporary economic crisis.  
• Remittances are not a driver of economic growth in Belarus – they support GDP growth 
immediately after flowing in to the country (this relationship is not statistically significant, 
though). Possibly they do this by increasing private domestic consumption, but in two 
quarters GDP responds negatively to remittance-related growth. This may be explained by 
possible brain drain effects and decreasing productivity due to lower return in remaining 
labour resources. 
• The negative influence of remittances on GDP is not caused by Dutch disease and inflation: 
neither are exchange rate appreciation, and growth in consumer price induced by 
remittances. Instead, lagged REER devaluation Granger causes growth in remittances 
inflow: when in crisis devaluation takes place in Belarus and more people go abroad to 
support their families and more transfers are made to the country.  
• In 2011-2012, labour demand remained nearly unchanged in Belarus despite an unfavourable 
economy, at least, in part, thanks to remittance led consumption. While facilitating domestic 
consumption growth and in this way supporting the restructuring of the national economy, it 
is hard to designate remittances as an important driving force in investment. Their 
investment potential is not very high: in 2012 remittances made up 4.6% of gross capital 
formation. However, remittances may become an important source of personal fund 
investment in the economy: their volume stood at 75% of personal funds invested in 2012. 
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• The impact of remittances in reducing poverty is rather limited. External labour migration in 
Belarus is more an urban than a rural phenomenon. Rural migrants comprise only 18.3% of 
those working in Russia and 10.7% of labour migrants working in other countries. At the 
same time poverty is higher in rural areas: according to HBS the share of rural population 
with per capita disposable resources below subsistence level budget stood at11.5% in 2011 
and 9.4% in 2012 (5.8% and 5.2% respectively for urban areas).  
• There are some signs that a stream of excess labour force to Russia has let the government 
off the hook in terms of any reform of the unemployment social security system and the 
education system, which still do not match the labour market. So, in a sense, labour 
migration and remittances creates moral hazard for the government as remittances 
particularly take the pressure off governments. Negative demographic tendencies and a 
labour resources decrease were not addressed deeply until tensions, caused by massive 
skilled workers outflows to Russia, emerged. 
 
Policy recommendations  
• There is a need to capacity build institutions and human resources, while conducting 
research into the whole spectrum of remittances and labour migration issues in accordance 
with international standards. The collecting and use of disaggregated population data for the 
development of socio-economic policies and programmes is presently inadequate. Given the 
open borders between Belarus and Russia and the free movement of people it is necessary to 
conduct regular household and individual surveys on migration issues and the employment 
of the Belarusians abroad. Results of household and individual surveys on migration issues 
can supplement official sources based on the balance of payment statistics. They can provide 
important information on: who remits and who receives remittances; how much and through 
which channels remittances come; and how remittances are spent by receiving households. 
• To increase remittances contributions to the economy it is important to keep remittances 
facilitation (namely low transaction costs, growing financial literacy and widening set of 
financial instruments for households) on the policy agenda in Belarus. Governments should 
try not to control remittances and their receivers, but rather they must let migrants remit 
without restraints. The free flow of remittances will allow these transfers to adjust to cyclical 
fluctuations in the Belarusian economy in a manner that has positive implications for 
economic stability. The best way for policy makers to encourage the productive investment 
of remittances is to pursue macroeconomic policies that allow a stable and propitious 
investment climate and to create specific institutions that make investments more attractive.  
To channel remittances for investment purposes the government could institutionalise a 
centralised remittance bureau, whose mandate would be to promote the use of remittances 
for economic development. For instance, this bureau could offer a tax concession for 
remitters investing in bond and stock markets and cheaper credits for business purposes. To 
qualify for these benefits, migrants or their families would have to submit proof of 
sending/receiving remittances. This mechanism might be a good point to start engaging in 
economic development, as the Diaspora’s financial potential has been, to date, almost totally 
ignored. 
• Government should design and implement a Migration Lens framework as part of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies. While designing this approach it should recognize that 
there is a need for an agency empowered with significant influence among government 
organizations to implement and facilitate migration-focused policies. This agency should be 
in possession of evidence-based policy instruments, supported by expert knowledge and with 
sufficient data.  
Regardless of whether it has or does not have the status of the main mediator of the country’s 
migration strategy, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection together with Ministry of the 
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Economy should make significant efforts to improve labor market institutions in Belarus: 
comprehensive reforms of wage regulation, labour taxes and the pension system, 
unemployment security system and creation of the institutions of socially responsible 
restructuring are needed. The first step in this list should be continuation of the wage-setting 
liberalization started in 2011: the compressed grading pay system, which is still mandatory in 
the public sector, should be abolished together with changes in other regulations necessary to 
allow proper wage differentiation. This would allow remittances to boost economic growth. 
1. Introduction  
Recent increases in remittance flows, fostering further global economic interdependence, have 
attracted the attention of academics and policy makers internationally. According to the World Bank 
remittances totalled an estimated 501 billion USD in 2011, of which 372 billion USD went to 
developing countries. This involved nearly 192 million migrants or 3.0% of the world population. 
Remittance flows to the developing world are expected to exceed earlier estimates standing at 406 
billion USD in 2012, an increase of 6.5 percent over the previous year1
Remittances are playing an increasingly significant role in the economies of many countries, 
contributing to economic growth and poverty reduction by providing a means of consumption for poor 
households. They are also a source of potential saving and investment in households, including 
investments in health and education. In addition remittance transfers promote access to financial 
services for the sender and for the recipient, thereby increasing financial and social inclusion. As a 
stable source of foreign exchange, they help to finance imports and to service foreign debt, thus 
indirectly financing development.  
. 
However, remittances bring with them not only potential benefits. They also have costs for 
migrant-sending countries. Remittances can cause domestic currency appreciation and remittances can 
ease pressure on governments to implement reforms and correct internal imbalances.  
As for the policy dimension, remittances may be viewed from a variety of perspectives. The 
insights of development economists, rural micro-economists, business people, social development 
analysts, security specialists, and financial experts studying remittance flows tend to focus on one 
specific aspect. Remittances may be seen, depending on the viewer’s perspective, as: household 
income; a hard-earned transnational family livelihood; a macroeconomic flow; potential dirty money; 
a source of development finance; or a business opportunity. Thus, remittances emerge as a different 
kind of issue in different policy areas (Betts, 2011). 
The specific objective of the present paper is to evaluate development impact and the side effects of 
remittances in Belarus. While our attempt to assess the broad range of remittance impact in Belarus is 
interesting per se (it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study with such a broad focus), there is 
another important reason for studying the Belarusian context. Belarus is the first case in the CIS where 
a lower income country has built an integrated labour market with its more prosperous neighbour, 
Russia. Reducing the monetary costs of migration leads to higher mobility and remittances, which can 
support the Belarusian economy and stabilise the same during a crisis. Our first hypothesis, thus, is 
that remittances to Belarus are strongly influenced by Russian economic growth. Second, we can 
hypothesise that, overall, as in most other countries, remittances are generally positive for the 
economic development of Belarus. Regarding the second hypothesis a lot depends on the comparative 
characteristics of labour markets in Russia and Belarus: these characteristics determine returns on 
human capital and, consequently on migrant selectivity. We will offer, following on from our findings, 
some recommendations for labour market policy and for remittances facilitation and utilization. 
                                                     
1 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/Migration Development 
Brief19.pdf. 
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We are going to address research questions by analysing data and by assessing the development 
impact and side effects of remittances in Belarus at an aggregate level using VAR methodology.  
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the institutional context for 
labour migration in Belarus describing developments in the common labour market with Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Section 3 has statistical data on remittances, definition of remittances in Belarus and 
provides the estimated number of labour migrants. Section 4 presents a description of remittances 
profiles in Belarus, assessing the size of remittance flows to Belarus, their share in GDP compared to 
other CIS countries, the main remittance-sending countries and the patterns of remittances use. Section 
5 addresses economic and other developmental impacts and side effects of remittances in Belarus. 
Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions and summarizes the policy options for facilitating 
remittance use for development. 
2. The Institutional context for labour migration: A developing common labour market 
with Russia and Kazakhstan 
Common Economic Space (hereinafter CES) promises the three CIS countries – Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan – both positive and uncertain consequences. Certainly, it stimulates migration processes, 
as it gives people freedom of movement within CES for citizens of the member states.  
The Agreement for the legal status of migrant workers and their family members and the 
Agreement for cooperation in counteraction to illegal third-country states labour migration (both 
signed 19 November, 2010) stipulates freedom of movement. This means the abolition of any sort of 
discrimination between citizens of the three relevant states and the creation of unified legislation on 
job placement, remuneration, and other work and employment conditions.  
The major strength of the second agreement is that labour migrants of the three countries do not 
need permits for labour activities in CES countries. Besides, in accordance with the separate 
regulations of direct action of the forementioned Agreement from 1 January, 2012 – labour-
migrants – citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan carrying out their labour activities in the territory of 
Belarus, as well as citizens of Belarus in the territories of Russia and Kazakhstan, enjoy the 
following advantages and preferences: 
the labour-migrant and their family members are relieved of registration (reporting themselves 
to the local employment body) for 30 days from their arrival date; 
in the case of the early termination of an employment contract but after 90 days from the arrival 
date, the labour migrant has the right to enter into a new employment contract within 15 days. This 
includes a contract with another employer with the terms specified by the legislation.  
Thereby, from 1 January, 2012 the conditions for realizing labour activities by the labour 
migrant of one of the three countries in any of the CES-member states are those of nationals. Even 
so, relations between the labour migrant and his or her employer are regulated by the legislation of 
the employer country.  
It should be noted that the unified legal treatment of employment has been in effect for more than 
10 years between Belarus and Russia within the scope of the Union State. Thus, in compliance with 
Article 7 of The Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation for Equal Rights 
of the Citizens of 25 December, 1998, both countries provide arriving workers in the Union State with 
the employment, remuneration rights, and other social and legal guaranties. Thereby, from 1999 
Russians have been working in Belarus like Belarusians provided that they are staying legally in the 
territory of the state and vice versa. Since January 2012 Kazakhstan has also joined this kind of 
regulation for temporary employment.  
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After this kind of striking reduction in costs for labour migration what results can we expect for CES 
countries? Human-capital theory predicts that migration will flow from areas of relatively poor earnings 
to places where opportunities are better (Borjas, 1999). One aspect of the potential gains from migration 
that is uniquely important when analyzing international labor flows is the distribution of earnings in the 
sending as well as in the receiving country. The relative distribution of earnings can help predict which 
skill groups within a sending country are most likely to emigrate (Roy, 1951). In a country that offers a 
low rate of return to a worker’s human capital the skilled do not earn much more than the unskilled. 
This situation generates incentives for the skilled to migrate to countries with more unequal distribution 
of earnings because they have the most to gain by moving. Such a country is the recipient of a “brain 
drain”. Unskilled workers in countries with more equality of earnings are well paid compared with 
unskilled workers in countries with higher inequality. They thus have less incentive to move. 
The key implication of the Roy model is that the relative payoff for skills across countries 
determines the skill composition of the immigrant flow. The Roy model implies that immigrants who 
originate in countries that offer a low rate of return to human capital will earn more than immigrants 
who originate in countries that offer a higher rate of return (Borjas, 1987).  
A surprising implication of the Roy model is that neither the “base level” of income in the source 
country, nor the “base level” in the destination country determines the type of selection that generates 
the immigrant flow. Changes in these base income levels, however, do affect the size of the flow. 
Human-capital theory clearly also predicts that, as migration costs fall, the flow of migrants will 
rise. Migration costs are mainly determined by distance and by the costs of obtaining permits and 
registration. The costs of moving increase with distance for two reasons. First, acquiring trustworthy 
information (often from friends or colleagues) on opportunities elsewhere is easier – especially for 
workers whose jobs are in “local” labor markets – when employment prospects are closer to home. 
Second, the time and money cost of a move and of trips back to see friends and relatives, and hence the 
psychic costs of the move, rise with distance (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2011). 
The possible consequences of labour market integration and the subsequent reduction in costs of 
labour migration in CES on changes in migration flows in Belarus become clearer after comparing wage 
levels in CES countries. The average wages level in Russia and Kazakhstan was, in the middle of 2012, 
1.7 and 1.5 times higher than in Belarus: respectively 834.2, 712 and 471.2 US dollars in July 20122
Differences in GDP per capita between Belarus and Russia are even more impressive (Figure 1). 
While the income inequality ratio has remained relatively stable since 2005, differences in GDP per 
capita have increased sharply, especially in the last three years. 
.  
                                                     
2 However, when comparing wages level on PPP bases, Belarus concedes only to Russia (see Table A1). 
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Figure 1.Differences between Russia and Belarus in GDP per capita and income distribution 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, Belstat, Rosstat (see data in Table A1, Appendix A). 
Belarus has a more compressed earnings distribution than is found in Russia3
We might think that Russia will be a popular destination for migration from Belarus, not only for 
economic reasons and geographic proximity, but also because of the absence of linguistic and cultural 
barriers. Taking into account the fact that Russian labour resources are decreasing, the demand for 
labour migrants from Belarus is hardly reduced. Thus, according to the conservative scenario of 
Rosstat’s recent forecast the working age population will go down from 86 million in 2012 to 77.3 
million by 2031. In 2015-2017 the decrease is expected to be over 1 million people annually
. In Belarus the average 
earnings differential between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller. This implies that the returns on 
human capital investments are lower than in Russia (income inequality proxies for the rate of return to 
skills). Thus, skilled and professional workers from Belarus can gain from emigration to Russia. In 
theory immigrants to Russia from Belarus should be more skilled than the average non-emigrating 
Belarusian worker: we can expect positively selected immigrant flow according to the Roy model. 
4
In the context of integrated labour market development in CES one should expect that the reduced 
monetary costs of migration will lead to a growth in remittances and the more significant impact of the 
latter on the Belarusian economy. However, if our proposition about positively selected migrant flows 
to Russia is true then a positive remittance impact can be reduced in consequence of possible brain 
drain effects. 
. 
                                                     
3 Personal income taxes are at almost the same level in both countries: 12 % (Belarus) and 13% (Russia). 
4 See http://www.trud.ru/article/29-05-2013/1294333_za_8_let_trudosposobnoe_naselenie_rf_sokratitsja 
_na_12_mln_chelovek.html. 
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3. Definition and statistical data on remittances in Belarus 
a. Balance of payments data on remittances 
In Belarus, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB hereafter) is responsible for 
monitoring and regulating remittances. The definition of remittances has been, since 2012, taken 
from the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual 
(BPM6, 2007).  
The BPM6 is currently being implemented by countries around the world. As such remittances 
represent household income from foreign economies arising mainly from the temporary or permanent 
movement of people to those economies. Remittances include cash and non-cash items that flow via 
official channels, such as electronic wire or through informal channels, such as money or goods 
carried across borders. They consist largely of: funds and non-cash items sent or given by individuals 
who migrated to a new economy and become residents there; and the net compensation of border, 
seasonal, or other short-term workers who are employed in an economy in which they are not resident. 
The methodological notes of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus suggest that the two 
items in the balance of payments framework that substantially relate to remittances are “compensation 
of employees” and “personal transfers.” Both of these standard components are recorded in the current 
account. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term 
workers, who are employed in an economy where they are not resident, and to residents employed by 
non-resident entities. The compensation of employees represents “remuneration in return for the labor 
input to the production process contributed by an individual in an employer-employee relationship 
with the enterprise.” The compensation of employees is recorded without reference to taxes and other 
expenses incurred in the economy where the work is performed.  
Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident 
households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers 
between resident and non-resident individuals. Therefore, personal transfers are a subset of current 
transfers. They cover all current transfers that are sent by individuals to individuals. “Personal 
transfers” replaces an item called “workers’ remittances” in the standard BPM presentation. In Belarus 
personal transfers are currently presented by NBRB as consisting of two items: workers’ remittances 
and other transfers between households. 
Balance of payments data on remittances in Belarus starting from 2012 consist of the following 
standard components (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Components required for compiling remittance items and their source 
Item Source and description 
1. Compensation of employees Primary income account, standard component  
2. Personal transfers Secondary income account, standard component  
3.Travel and transport related to 
employment of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers 
Goods and services account, supplementary item 
4.Taxes and social contributions related to 
employment of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers 
Secondary income account, supplementary item 
5. “Net” compensation of 
employees(Compensation of employees 
less expenses related to border, seasonal, 
and other short-term workers) 
Item 1 minus the sum of item 3 and item 4 
6. Capital transfers between households  Capital account, supplementary item  
7. Personal remittances Item 2 plus item 5 plus item 6 
8. Social benefits Secondary income account, supplementary item 
9. Total remittances Item 7 plus item 8 
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. 
Hereafter, if not otherwise noted, remittances equal the sum of compensation of employees’ 
volume and workers’ remittances volume as they are represented in the balance of payments. This is 
sole way to analyse remittances inflows and outflows in Belarus in a timely fashion. 
Statistics on personal transfers, provided by the NBRB, is based on official banking institutions’ 
reporting of financial transactions with non-Belarus residents and on money transferred through 
money-transfer operators.  
Statistics on employee compensation is based on the NBRB estimations of money transferred 
through informal channels (family, friends, train conductors and drivers who carry money across 
borders etc.). It is an expert estimate agreed with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 
The estimated number of Belarusian citizens engaged in the Russian economy is presented in Table 
2. They are used for computing employees’ compensation. 
Table 2. The number of Belarusian citizens engaged in the Russian economy, recorded in the 
Republic of Belarus balance of payment in 2011-2012. 
Indicator 
2011 2012 
1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 1 Q 2 Q 
Number of Belarusian citizens working in 
Russia under registered signed contracts 3 233 3 148 3 124 3 452 3 891 4 306 
Number of Belarusian citizens considered 
in addition to the above in foreign 
employees’ compensation accounts 
(estimate) 
40 340 51 883 58 353 47 450 41 916 52 514 
Total 43 573 55 031 61 477 50 902 45 807 56 820 
Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. 
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The problem with the estimated number of Belarusian citizens considered in addition to those 
working under the registered signed contracts (52,500 in Q2 2012) is that it is based on a very rough 
estimate: it is calculated as the share of the number of Ukrainian labour migrants (illegal and having 
working permisions – 214,400 in Q2 2012). The share, in turn, is calculated as a quotient of 
Belarusians entries to Russia on private purposes to those of Ukrainians (24.5% in Q2 2012).There are 
at least two reasons why it is not possible to consider this approach as sound: first, labour migrants 
from Ukraine do not have such a privileged status as Belarusian ones; second, absence of border 
control between Belarus and Russia does not allow a real number of entries for private purposes. 
Employee compensation is calculated by multiplying the estimated number of migrants by the 
average wage in the corresponding sector: the assumption is that half of Belarusians work in the 
Russian construction sector while the average wage in transport, wholesale and retail trade and 
extraction sector is used. 
The NBRB approach for estimating remittances has serious limitation. But there has been no 
attempts to consider other sources of data and to evaluate the official data on remittances for Belarus.  
More precise resource inflows that migrant workers may make to their households and national 
economy could be identified only through research based on surveys at household and individual 
levels. However, no nationwide survey has been conducted in Belarus devoted to immigration, never 
mind to labour migration issues.  
Some existing sources of data, namely the Census, the Household Budgetary Survey and the 
Labour Force Survey, that could be used to make estimates of remittances volume more accurate, are 
described briefly in Appendix B. The most reliable of them, the LFS, is not, at present, designed to 
provide individual level information on remittances in Belarus. It is not actually possible at present to 
understand, using LFS and HBS, results who remits and who receives remittances; how much and 
through which channels; and how remittances are spent by receiving households. But it is possible to 
use these data sources to make some adjustment for the balance of payments estimate of remittances in 
Belarus which remains the only source of information on remittances. With this purpose in mind, we 
present below some statistics and characteristics of labour migration profile from the above mentioned 
sources and from other sources. 
b. Estimated number of labour migrants 
Migration statistics from Belarus are based on the rules of population registration by place of 
residence and place of stay, implemented in 2008. There are two categories of migrants: permanent 
(long-term) migrants, who are registered by place of residence, and temporary migrants, who are 
registered by place of stay. The term of registration by the place of stay is limited to 1 year. 
International temporary migration matches labour migration.  
According to the Balance of labour resources, where LFS data were used in 2012, the number 
of citizens employed abroad equals 55,400 (Appendix C). It is 1.2% of the employed population.  
Before the detailed LFS data is made available to the general public the census data remains the 
best source for understanding labour migrant profiles in Belarus (see Appendix D). According to the 
2009 Census data, 41,783 people worked outside Belarus (Table 3), of whom 37,676 (90.2%) worked 
in Russia. CIS-countries absorb 91.3% of labour migrants.  
The labour-migrants exchange between Belarus and Kazakhstan is not particularly significant in 
terms of volume. This is not surprising given the significant distance between the two countries 
(Lucas, 2001) and the rather small differences in wages. 
It should be noted that compared to domestic labour migration, external migration is significantly 
lower: while internal labour migration amounts to 8.9% of total employment (of which 2.6% have work 
on the territory of different oblast), only 0.9% of the employed population works abroad.  
 
Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Belarus 
CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 11 
Table 3.Employment of Belarusians by country of residence according Census 2009 (persons 
aged 15+ and employed abroad for less than 1 year) 
Employed population, total 4 613 351 - 
from which with workplace located in other 
country 41 783 (0.9%) 100 
CIS country 38 141 91.3 
Russia 37 676 90.2 
Ukraine 364 0.9 
Kazakhstan 49 0.1 
Non-CIS country 3 440 8.2 
Lithuania 724 1.7 
Poland 643 1.5 
USA 293 0.7 
Germany 286 0.7 
Italy 197 0.5 
Latvia 118 0.3 
Czech Republic 114 0.3 
Source: Census 2009. See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/2009/pc_publications.php. 
Census 2009 data show that the general level of education of labour migrants to Russia was lower 
than the educational level of the average member of the Belarusian work force (Appendix D). In 2009, 
people with higher education made up 16.1% of labour migrants to Russia, while the average share of 
people with tertiary education working in Belarus was 25.3%. The difference is similar when 
considering labour emigrants by skills needed to hold an occupation (Table D1). The share of highly-
skilled workers was 14.1% among labour migrants to Russia and 25.7% among those employed in 
Belarus. However the share of skilled workers was higher among those who work in Russia (66.9% 
versus 61.7%). 
Despite a rather optimistic picture from the above data we cannot unreservedly conclude that 
labour migrants from Belarus are not positively selected. First, neither formal education nor 
occupations are adequate measures for labour migrant skills. Rich individual level data are needed to 
control for numerous unobserved characteristics and differences among migrants and non-migrant 
workers. Until now the only official statistics for labour migrants in Belarus has been limited to those 
having registered labour contracts and does not even provide data on education5
Second, the 2009 Census statistics for labour migrants is not quite reliable. As Chubrik and Kazlou 
(2013) argue, census data might underestimate labour migration, given that (a) it was implemented in 
mid-autumn when the share of non seasonal workers is significant; (b) some labour migrants might not 
take part in the census because their work abroad was in progress; (c) some temporary migrants might 
not be working not because they did not have a job but because they were waiting for an answer from 
their employers or were preparing to start work. Indeed, census data show that another 46,900 working-
aged Belarusians were waiting for the start of the working season, 31,200 awaited an answer from their 
. Thus, according to 
CMD in 2012 the number of citizens who left Belarus to work abroad equals 6,534 (see Appendix E) 
and their main destination is Russia (5,369 people or 82.2%). As one can see from Table E1 only 
4,200 of Belarusians were working abroad with signed contracts or agreements in 2009. And only 
2,600 of them in Russia. This is almost 15 times less than the numbers reported in the 2009 Census. 
                                                     
5 Statistics are provided by the Citizenship and Migration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of 
Belarus (CMD hereafter). It is necessary to note that the CMD data refers only to the people going abroad via agencies, 
who have a license from the Ministry of Internal Affairs for citizens’ employment assistance. As for the end of 2012, 75 
legal entities and individual entrepreneurs carry out this kind of business activity. Most Belarusians leave and become 
employed abroad unassisted exercising their right to freedom of movement. Independent job placement is provided for by 
Article 11 of the Law On Foreign Labour Migration. 
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employer, and yet another 6,300 were about to start working. This comprises additional labour migration 
capacity of more than 80,000 people.  
Finally, one should take into account the fact that the census was taken in 2009 when Russia was 
suffering from the global economic crisis and its labour market was stagnant.  
Apart from this, there is some mismatch with the 2009 Census figures concerning data for non-CIS 
countries. Thus, according to the Polish data on employers’ declarations to employ foreigners the 
number of temporary workers from Belarus is much higher than suggested by the 2009 Census6. In 
2011 Belarusians comprise 6% (2,600) of total inflows of foreigners into Poland, while 2001-2010 
average was 7%7
So it is no surprise that expert estimates on the number of labour migrants significantly differ from 
official data. The upper threshold for Belarus’ labour emigrants’ was provided by a World Bank 
assessment in 2005, according to which 400,000 Belarusians worked abroad in 2004 (IOM, 2006). A 
year later the Chief of the Citizenship and Migration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Republic of Belarus said the number was 300,000
. The Polish Population Census identified a stock of 56,300 temporary immigrants in 
2011, of which 78% were foreign citizens, mainly from Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, the Russian 
Federation, China, Bulgaria and Vietnam.  
8
A quantitative assessment of the number of labour migrants from Belarus is rather complicated (see 
Zagorets and Zagorets, 2011; Bobrova, Shakhotska and Shymanovich, 2012).  
. According to one estimate, 300,000-700,000 
Belarusians work in Russia and 60,000-70,000 in the EU. These send home, by the same estimate, 2-3 
billion USD in remittances annually (Wilson and Popescu, 2009). Integration Research Center of the 
European Development Bank estimated the number of Belarusian migrants working in Russia in 2010 
stood at 171,000, from which 67,300 work officially (see Appendix F). Recently, Luchenok and 
Kolesnikova (2011) estimated labour emigration at 150,000 a year. 
Bobrova, Shakhotska and Shymanovich (2012) take a rather extreme method to estimate the 
number of Belarusians working abroad. They calculate the difference between the total number of 
people of working age and the number of people employed in the national economy. This difference 
was 1,376,900 in 2011 and 1,452,900 in 2012 (Appendix C). It is not a good estimate because this 
figure includes among others: enrolled students not combining work with study; workers on maternity 
leave; and child-care leave until the age of three years; citizens receiving allowance for care for the 
elderly and disabled adults and children; citizens employed abroad; officially unemployed, citizens 
imprisoned and citizens retrained on assignment of agencies for labour, employment and social 
protection. Before 2012 (when LFS data on unemployment appeared in the balance) the item “Others” 
calculated in the national balance of labour resources as difference between labour resources and 
employed population and all the items listed above was a much better reference point for the numbers 
working abroad. This item equaled 110,500 in 2012. To this we can add at least part of the number of 
unemployed not registered officially – 211,100. 
We propose to estimate the number of labour migrants based on the data gathered by Federal 
Migration Agency of the Russian Federation, which in the case of Belarusians collects data from 
arrival notices (Table 4). According to the legislation for all Belarusians arriving in Russia the 
receiving party should fill in this arrival notice and send to the territorial body of Federal 
Migration Agency. 
                                                     
6 Since 2006 a simplified procedure for employment without issuance of a work permit has led to increased inflow of foreign 
labour in Poland. Citizens of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation now only need a 
declaration of a Polish employer in order to work up to six months during twelve consecutive months. 2011 saw a 44% 
increase in such declarations, to almost 260 000. 92% of the declarations registered by Polish employers were for 
Ukrainians. 
7 See International Migration Outlook 2013, OECD 2013, pp. 284-285 (www.oecd.org/migration/imo). 
8 See http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/. 
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Table 4. Statistics of the Federal Migration Agency of the Russian Federation on Belarusians 
registered by the place of stay and receiving permits on residence 
 
From 
February 
3rd 2009 to 
Registered 
by place of 
stay 
Permits on temporary 
residence Residence permits 
Residence permits 
(article 4) 
Number of 
applications 
approved 
by them  
Number of 
applications 
approved 
by them  
Number of 
applications 
approved 
by them  
December 
31st 2010 
321 885 
(160 943 
per year) 
1 602 1 487 601 482 2 063 1 479 
December 
31st 2011 
518 668 
(+196 783) 2 164 1 973 1 052 848 4 152 3 040 
December 
31st 2012 
712 711 
(+194 043) 2 784 2 595 1 522 1 269 10 312 7 741 
Source: Federal Migration Agency of the Russian Federation 
Figures in Table 4 show that in the last two years the average number of Belarusians registered in 
2011 and 2012 by the place of stay in Russia was, respectively, 196,000 and 194,000 respectfully (it is 
35,000 more than the average number for the previous two years). Suppose that only 20% of the 
registered were labour migrants (we do not count students, those registered by hotels, vacation houses 
etc.) and given that only 10% of labour migrants decide to fill in an arrival notice (in fact this share 
may be far less), 390,000 Belarusians visited Russia for work purposes. Taking into account that many 
of them are seasonal workers, we can estimate the number of labour migrants from Belarus working in 
Russia for a year (at any given moment of time) from 130,000 to180,000 depending on the duration of 
stay for work9
According to the Federal Migration Agency of the Russian Federation nearly 80% of Belarusians 
are registered in two Federal Districts (Figure 2): the Central Federal District (42.0%) and the North-
West Federal District (35.7%), both of which border Belarus and where the biggest Russian cities are 
located. This geographical distribution might as well prove correct for labour migrants: as one can see 
from Figure 2 these districts have wages twice as high as in Belarus. 
.The highest number of migrant workers in our estimated range makes up 3% of labour 
resources and 3.9% of employed population in 2012.  
The relative unpopularity among Belarusians of eastern Federal Districts with high average wages 
is explained as follows. There are higher costs of migration due to distance and due to the fact that a 
significant part of wage differentials in the Ural and Far Eastern districts is wage compensations for 
living in regions with a higher price level and worse non-pecuniary characteristics: e.g. air pollution, 
poor medical services and a colder climate. After adjusting for these regional characteristics, the 
relative ranking of regions in terms of average wages changes considerably. According to research 
findings (Oshchepkov, 2007), in Russia half of the interregional wage variation between workers with 
similar productive characteristics should be considered to be compensative. 
                                                     
9According to CMD data in 2012 72.6 percent of official contracts for work abroad were signed for the term equal or less 
than six months. By our estimation the average term of signed contracts was near five and a half months in 2012. To take 
into account a possible shorter duration of illegal work we took the range from five and a half to four months for 
calculations.  
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Figure 2.Average wage and number of Belarusians registered by  
the place of stay in Russian Federal Districts 
 
Source: Rosstat, Federal Migration Agency of the Russian Federation 
Our main conclusion based on the above estimates is that the Belarusian balance of payments for 
2012 uses lower numbers of Belarusian citizens engaged in the economy of Russia as a basis for 
computing remittance inflows. We shall return to this difference in the next section, while discussing 
the scale of remittances. 
As regards to the type of migrants’ selection which is equally important for our study, one might 
expect it could be determined more precisely through 2012 LFS data. when this data is given over to the 
public. But again, comparison of the expert estimates of the migrants’ number and the figure reported 
in the Balance of labour resources (55,400) throws up some preliminary concerns. One possible 
explanation of differences is that people may be unwilling to disclose information about their labour 
migration experience. Remember that in 2011 the authorities announced that those working abroad 
should pay 100% costs for public utilities and health care services.10
4. Characteristics of remittances in Belarus 
 
a. Scale, trends of inflows and outflows of remittances  
Labour migration revenues (the sum of employees’ compensation and workers’ remittances) have 
been growing in Belarus since 2002, with the exception of 2009 when remittances decreased as a 
result of the recession in Russia (Figure 3). It should be noted that the gap between inflow and outflow 
has steadily widened in the last ten years. 
The picture is not the same when one looks at the remittance inflows relative to Belarusian GDP 
(Figure 4): in 2009 their volume was highest in the period 2005-2010. It may indicate remittances’ 
counter-cyclical nature (they decrease relatively during an economic boom in the source country) on 
the one hand, and the availability of other sources of economic growth, on the other. The share of 
remittances inflow in GDP reached 1.5% in 2012. 
                                                     
10 In 2011 only 22-25% of public utilities costs were repaid by population (http://news.tut.by/economics/230929.html).  
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Figure 3.Inflows and outflows of remittances in Belarus in 1993-2012, mln USD 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook); NBRB data for 2011 and 2012. 
Figure 4. Remittances inflows to Belarus as a percentage to GDP( %) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and NBRB data for 2011 and 2012. 
The comparative dependence of Belarusian economy on remittances is shown in Figure 5, which 
represents shares of remittances in GDP in CIS-countries in 2010. 
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Figure 5. The share of remittance inflows in GDP of CIS-countries in 2010, %  
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Source: World Development Indicators 
It can be observed that more developed CIS countries are characterized by a smaller remittances 
quota in their GDP: in 2010 only Kazakhstan and Russia had smaller remittances inflows than Belarus. 
At the same time the remittance share of Belarusian GDP was tightly connected with Russian 
economic development as it remains the main labour migrants’ destination country. Belarusians had 
less incentive to work in Russia as the Russian ruble weakened 35% against the dollar from the onset 
of the crisis in August to January 2009. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the slow recovery of remittances 
began only in the last quarter of 2009. 
Figure 6. Year-on-year growth in remittances inflows in Belarus (2009-2012, quarterly) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NBRB Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Until 2011, when Belarus faced a socio-economic crisis, the country has not relied extensively on 
remittance inflows. It is not surprising, that National Bank data now show remittances growing at a 
rapid pace in 2011. The 60% increase in remittances (in dollar terms) reported for Belarus in 2011 
was, to the best of our knowledge, the largest in the region. This growth continued during all quarters 
of 2012 indicating that the recovery from 2011 crisis is still in progress. 
b. Structure of remittances, main countries and channels 
The structure of remittances inflows and outflows differs significantly (see Table 1 and Figure 5). In 
the case of inflows there is a domination of employees’ compensation, and its share equaled 60% in 
2012. The opposite is true in the case of outflows: the share of employees’ compensation has been 
growing since 2005, when it was only 0.6% (12.5% in 2012). 
Table 1.The structure of remittances in Belarus, 2005-2012, million USD 
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Employees’ compensation 
inflow 120.1 175.4 156.6 413.8 333.7 327.7 495.1 569.0 
Workers’ remittances 
inflow 78.5 90.1 128.3 164.0 165.2 198.8 350.4 379.5 
Employees’ compensation 
outflow 0.3 2.5 5.0 11.3 10.0 11.9 12.4 15.9 
Workers’ remittances 
outflow 51.9 67.8 96.6 156.9 120.8 86.5 106.4 110.9 
Source: NBRB Balance of Payments Statistics. 
Figure 5. The difference in remittances structure between inflows and outflows,2005-2012 
  
 
a) remittances inflows 
 
b) remittances outflows 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NBRB Balance of Payments Statistics. 
Given that 90.2% of labour migrants, according to Census data, work in Russia, it is not surprising 
that Russia dominates in remittances inflows. More than 57% of remittances came from this country in 
2011 (Figure 6). Next comes France (6.9%), Latvia and the USA (5.3%), Sweden (3.7%) and 
Kazakhstan (2.4%).  
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Figure 6. Remittances inflows and outflows structure by countries in 201111 
  
a) Inflows  b) Outflows  
Source: NBRB Balance of Payments Statistics. 
 
Russia prevails also in terms of remittances from Belarus: it absorbed 38.4% of total 
remittances outflow in 2011 followed by the USA (9.8%), Germany (7.4%), China (4%), Belgium 
(3.8%), Spain (3.3%) and Lithuania (3%). 
Structure of only workers’ remittances by countries for 2012 is presented in Figure 7 and 
Table G1 (Appendix G). 
Figure7.Workers’ remittances inflows and outflows structure by countries in 2012 
  
a) Inflows b) Outflows 
Source: NBRB Balance of Payments Statistics. 
We can see that migrants send over 75% of workers’ remittances from Russia. The unexpectedly 
high workers’ remittances outflow may not only indicate the scale of immigration to Belarus- It may 
reflect too money transfers to intermediaries abroad who then organize goods purchase and send these 
                                                     
11Data are from Balance of Payments for 2011 and NBRB does not give any details for the category “other countries”. 
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on to Belarus. As such transfers are made between physical persons (households) it is not possible to 
separate it from workers’ remittances.12
The structure of personal remittances volume (calculated according to the methodology represented 
in Table 1) gives some more information about the net amount of remittance inflow. The volume of 
income taxes and social contributions related to employment of border, seasonal, and other short-term 
workers is set out in Appendix H. According to NBRB it composes only 1.2% of employees’ 
compensation. These figures confirm an intuitive conclusion that a lion’s share of employees’ 
compensation inflow is transferred through informal channels
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According to our rather modest estimate the number of labour migrants from Belarus working in 
Russia (130,000-180,000) is 2.5-3.5 times higher than that used by NBRB for employees’ 
compensation calculation (52.000 on average). Based on this ratio and taking into account Russia’s 
share in total remittances inflows (57.2%) we can estimate that in average remittances inflows to 
Belarus is 1.9-2.4 times higher than that recorded in balance of payments. Using this rough estimate 
we can approximately assess the size of remittances in Belarusian GDP in 2011-2012 at2.8-3.6%. 
Some further corrections could be made, e.g. Poland, as we noted above, is obviously underestimated 
as a destination country. 
. 
c. Patterns of use of remittances 
To the best of our knowledge, only one survey has been conducted on this topic (Shakhotska, 2003). 
The study is based on a “snowball approach” and is not fully representative. Problems that have been 
resolved with the help of labour migration revenues are presented in Table 2, comprised by using 
Shakhotska (2003). 
Table 2. Problems resolved by migrants due to labour migration 
Problems that have been resolved % of responses 
Improving of housing conditions and facilities 86.3 
Purchase of durables 70.9 
Purchase of good clothes 58.5 
Education-related issues 52.1 
Health care and recreation 52.1 
Allow good quality food 48.7 
Car purchase 33.3 
Help to relatives 22.2 
Business-related issues 21.4 
Subsistence 15.0 
Other reasons 2.1 
Note. Multiple choices were possible. 
Source: Shakhotska (2003). 
                                                     
12Additional research is needed to study this issue but we can assume that at least a part of outflows to China and USA are 
inflated by this import scheme. Analysis of postal service turnover between countries can help to make some adjustment 
to workers’ remittances outflow. 
13As for the main channels of personal transfers, they come mainly through financial institutions. At present on Belarusian 
market then remitters can use the services of 17 international transfer systems such as Western Union, Money Gram, 
Юнистрим, Contact, Лидер, Anelik, Быстрая почта, MIGOM, Interexpress, Золотая корона, BLIZKO, Аллюр, Блиц, 
FASTER, Сaspian Мoney Тransfer, Coinstar, PrivatMoney. But there are also quite significant in cash transfers from 
long-term migrants which can be estimated as at least 25% of the total value of personal transfers. 
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The study shows that labour migrants managed to resolve a number of major issues. These include 
improvement of housing conditions and facilities (most respondents had housing-related problems), 
purchasing durable consumption goods, good quality clothes and food. For 52.1% of respondents 
labour migration was a way to find funds to invest in education and recreation as well as for paying for 
medical services. Fewer than one quarter of respondents mentioned helping relatives and business-
related issues as their motive for migration. Finally, labour migration was a strategy for fighting 
poverty for only 15% of respondents. 
Again, data availability is a problem in analysing remittance patterns in Belarus. The structure of 
migrant workers’ expenditure is unknown. This makes it difficult to come to any sound conclusions 
about their impact on households and on the national economy overall. 
5. Development impact and side effects of remittances in Belarus 
It should be noted that most early articles on the effect of immigration on the source economy found 
unambiguous negative effects. For example, Grubel and Scott (1966), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) 
concluded that the source economy suffers a loss in income when natives immigrate to other countries. 
The more recent literature offers more ambiguous conclusions. During the last two decades or so, the 
economic analysis of remittances has experienced a significant renewal. It has been understood that 
source countries need not suffer economic decline from the departure of nationals. This has been done 
by linking immigration to human capital formation, introducing real world complications such as 
return migration and network effects, and technology ﬂows between countries. 
The microeconomics of remittances has focused, since the early 1980s, on the role of information 
and social interactions in explaining transfer behavior. Familial and strategic motives are increasingly 
acknowledged by economists as determinants of remittances14
Here the multidimensional impact of remittances on the social and economic situation of the 
receiving country must be borne in mind. In the empirical part of the paper we will focus on their 
influence on economic growth, foreign exchange, inflation, investment and financial development, 
employment, human capital formation, poverty and income inequality in Belarus. Possible channels of 
public moral hazard will be discussed as well. Where possible some recent results of empirical studies 
looking at development and the side effects of remittances in the CIS countries will be provided. 
 (Lucas and Stark, 1985). From a 
macroeconomic perspective, new growth theories have also altered a very great deal the directions of 
research into migration and remittances. While previous research in the 1970s and 1980s was centered 
on the short-term effects of international transfers within the framework of static trade models, the 
focus gradually shifted to long-run considerations, notably the role of remittances in the dynamics of 
inequality and development (Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1988). In a recent survey of Rapoport and 
Docquier (2006) evidence on the growth effects of remittances is demonstrated through their influence 
on inequality and human capital formation, entrepreneurship, productivity growth and rural 
development. It is shown that migration and associated remittances tend to have an overall positive 
effect on origin countries’ long-run economic performance. 
Before entering the empirical part of the paper it is worth noting that one of the reasons for a lack 
of consensus about the impact of migrants’ remittances in the literature may lie in the different 
approaches used. For instance, Chami et al. (2008) identify three differences in their studies on the 
impact of remittances on economic growth: (i) the measure of remittances used; (ii) the sample period; 
                                                     
14Lucas and Stark (1985) developed a theory that views remittances as part of an inter-temporal, mutually beneficial 
contractual arrangement between the migrant and the household in the country of origin. These contractual arrangements 
are based on investment and risk. In the case of investment the family bears the cost of educating the migrant worker who 
is expected to repay the investment in the form of remittances. This motive not only predicts that remittances could be 
higher for better educated workers, but also that remittances from the children of the head of the household would be 
higher than from in-laws and even spouses. 
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(iii) the variables included in the model; and (iv) the instrument used for remittances to deal with 
endogeneity. To this list, Sugiyarto and Vargas-Silva (Asian Development Bank, 2012) add (v) the 
selection of countries included in the estimate, given that some studies are regional (e.g., Mundaca 
2009 and Vargas-Silva et al. 2009); and (vi) the actual equation estimates, given that it is common to 
include a square term for remittances or interactions between remittances and other terms (e.g., 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). 
a. Remittances and economic growth 
Remittances can exert a positive impact on economic growth. Cross-country regressions indicate that 
remittances can have a positive, though relatively mild, impact on long-term growth (Mansoor and 
Quillin, 2007). The main channels of influence are investment in physical and human capital and 
consumption growth. Within the CIS, there is a strong regional differentiation in remittances impact 
on economic growth. For the low-income and small economies (Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, 
Armenia), remittances have become one of the main drivers of economic growth, while for larger and 
higher income economies (Ukraine, Belarus) this impact is not as important (Kupets, 2012). After 
2000, the growth of GDP in CIS countries coincided with the growth of remittances from the Russian 
Federation. The strong dependency between CIS countries growth and the growth of the Russian 
economy is explained, at least partially, by the large volume of remittances sent from Russia (Alturki, 
et. al., 2009). Remittances have a direct effect on consumption: the strong positive effect of 
consumption driven by remittances is noticed in food and light industries as well as services 
(Atamanov, et. al, 2009).  
At the same time, however, Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2003) build on the idea that 
remittances take place under asymmetric information and are likely to generate moral hazard 
problems. They argue that remittances can have a negative effect on economic growth in receiving 
countries. They test this prediction using aggregated panel data for 113 countries. They apply various 
econometric techniques. They find a negative effect of remittances on growth after controlling for the 
investment/GDP ratio, regional dummies and other control variables. But the authors disregard the 
possibility that, due to liquidity constraints, remittances could affect investments (thus making the 
investment/GDP ratio endogenous) and human capital formation, the latter variable being completely 
absent from their analysis. 
The positive sides of remittances for the CIS states are their low volatility and neutral impact on 
foreign debt (Schrooten, 2006). On the other hand, high levels of remittances may cause the 
dollarization of the national economy and the quick growth of import (Havrylyshyn and Beddies, 
2003). In four of the CIS countries the volume of remittances exceeds volume of FDI: in 2003, the 
ratio was 7.9 for Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, 5.9 for Tajikistan and 1.3 for Armenia (Schrooten, 2006). For 
Belarus, this indicator has been rather volatile – in 2003 it was about 1.3, in 2011 – 0.2 and increased 
to 0.7 in 2012 (Table 3).  
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Table 3.Remittances inflow to Belarus in relation to GDP and selected balance of payments 
inflows, 1993-2011 
Year 
Remittances inflow as percentage of 
GDP Net ODA Net FDI 
Net private 
capital 
flows 
Exports of 
goods, 
services and 
income 
Goods 
exports 
1993 0.002 0.2 2.3 2.3 0.02 0.02 
1994 0.002 0.3 3.8 3.8 0.01 0.02 
1995 0.2 12.8 193.9 193.9 0.54 0.59 
1996 2.1 458.9 335.4 389.4 5.2 6.1 
1997 1.8 536.6 84.3 89.3 3.7 4.3 
1998 1.8 808.6 156.9 146.3 4.4 5.1 
1999 1.5 545.1 47.0 49.3 3.2 3.7 
2000 0.9 403.6 117.4 85.4 1.8 2.1 
2001 1.0 378.2 156.2 197.4 1.8 2.0 
2002 0.8 357.2 31.0 31.6 1.5 1.8 
2003 1.1 459.2 130.6 126.1 1.9 2.2 
2004 1.0 517.6 158.0 113.9 1.6 1.8 
2005 0.8 440.4 84.2 97.5 1.4 1.6 
2006 0.9 444.1 96.8 104.7 1.5 1.7 
2007 0.7 422.9 19.8 20.2 1.3 1.5 
2008 1.1 617.0 31.6 31.5 1.8 2.1 
2009 1.1 603.5 33.0 32.7 2.3 2.8 
2010 1.0 427.2 43.6 23.2 1.9 2.3 
2011 1.4 663.1 20.7 17.0 1.7 2.0 
2012 1.5 -* 70.6 82.3 1.7 2.1 
1995-1999 
average 1.5 472.4 163.5 173.6 3.4 3.9 
2000-2007 
average 0.9 427.9 99.2 97.1 1.6 1.8 
2008-2012 
average 1.2 577.7** 40.1 37.5 1.9 2.3 
* Not available; **Average for 2008-2011 
Note: Remittances inflows include compensation of employees and workers’ remittances. Net ODA refers to net official 
development assistance and official aid received. Net FDI refers to the net inflows of foreign investment. Net private capital 
flows consist of net foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. 
Source: Author’s calculations, World Development Indicators (based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and 
data files), NBRB data for 2012. 
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It is worth noting that remittances can be strongly pro-cyclical, which means that remittances 
decrease (increase) after downturns (upturns) in the home economy. In this case, receiving countries 
may have to deal with an additional impact (i.e. amplification effect) of upturns or downturns in the 
receiving economy. Alternatively, remittances can be strongly counter-cyclical, which means that 
remittances increase significantly when the home economy is in a downturn. Remittances may then 
work as macroeconomic stabilisers that boost the recipient economy during downturns and cool off the 
economy during upturns. In this case receiving countries could use these flows as a part of broader 
stabilisation policies. 
Vargas Silva (2012) concludes that the cyclical nature of remittances tends to be country specific 
and suggests that for some corridors remittances are counter-cyclical15
The impact of remittances on economic growth in Belarus has not been studied in detail yet. 
According to a study by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2008) the size of 
remittances in Belarus was estimated at 6.3% of GDP in 2006. In their study in 2011 Luchenok and 
Kolesnikova, based on Ratha and Shaw’s (2007) approach, estimated that remittances made up about 
2% of GDP and 2.6% of gross external debt in 2010. They considered remittances as a substantial 
support for the national economy (Luchenok and Kolesnikova, 2011). The volume of remittances sent 
to Belarus had been seriously hit by the crisis in the Russian economy in 2009, though there was no 
change in its share in national GDP (between 0.7 and 1%) due to devaluation of the Belarusian 
currency. In 2009 the largest part of Belarusian labour migrants worked in the Russian Federation – 
about 82% of the remittances sent to Belarus came from Russia (comparing to 63% in Georgia, 84% – 
Armenia and 42% – Moldova (O’Hara, Ivlevs and Gentile, 2009).  
, while for others remittances 
are pro-cyclical. 
The data in the Table 3 show that the share of remittances in GDP and main balance of payments 
inflows is not high, especially compared to some transition countries (e.g. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova). In 1990 their share was substantively higher in relation to net FDI and private capital flows, 
as well as to exports of goods, services and income. The only exception is net official development 
assistance and official aid received. 
However, as the 2008-2012 average share illustrates, the significance of remittances has grown 
since the 2000-2007 period. Their importance may be even higher taking into account that 
remittances’ inflow has been underestimated in Belarus for the last two years. 
In the case of Belarus we suggest that during last years remittances were counter-cyclical in nature 
(Figure 8).  
                                                     
15 The counter-cyclical nature of remittances may also affect the selection of an exchange rate regime by receiving countries. 
Remittances mitigate the costs of losing domestic monetary policy autonomy (i.e. losing the ability to respond to 
economic shocks) by serving as a risk-sharing mechanism. After a negative shock in output, there is an increase in 
emigration from the country and an increase in remittances from both previous and new migrants. Frankel (2011) argues 
that this suggests that remittances should join trade, labour mobility, and other transfers between countries, on the list of 
Optimum Currency Area criteria.  
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Figure 8.Remittances inflow compared to net FDI, 1993-2011 
 
In 2011-2012 remittances worked as a macroeconomic stabilizer, supporting the national economy 
during an economic crisis. It is a smaller but more stable source of development than private FDI 
flows. Thus, in 2012, while GDP has grown by 1.5% remittances have increased by 12.2%. The 
growth rate of personal remittances was even more significant, by 15.2% (Appendix H). 
To reveal the effect of remittances on the Belarusian economy we apply the methodology of vector 
autoregression (VAR) model in reduced form as one of the most flexible for the analysis of the 
multivariate time series. The VAR model, which is often seen as an alternative approach to the 
simultaneous equation approach, has proven to be especially useful in describing the dynamic 
behavior of the economic and financial time series. 
We use data for 2005Q1-2013Q1, since quarterly data on remittances are available only from 2005 
(see Appendix I Table I1 and Table I2 for the description of variables). Tests of non-stationarity show 
that all time series have to be transformed to their stationary values (Table I3). 
We start first with an analysis of remittance impact on economic growth. An analysis of seasonally 
adjusted Belarusian GDP and remittances dynamics (2005=100) shows that both time series have a 
stochastic trend: see Figure I1; first autocorrelation coefficients are 0.91 and 0.90 respectfully. The 
first differencing eliminates the problem of stochastic trending. 
The pair-wise correlations (Table I4 and Table I5) indicate that remittances appear to be pro-
cyclical with respect both to Belarusian and Russian GDP. However, the bi-variate nature of pair-wise 
correlations makes it difficult to control for additional factors. We must seek for stronger confirmation 
of that conclusion by estimating the VAR model and conducting Granger causality tests. 
The Bayesian information criterion (and well as LR, AIC and HQIC criterions) shows that the 
number of lags needed is 2 (see Table I6). So the preferable model in differences in the remittances 
and GDP series is VAR(2)16
                                                     
16 White’s heteroskedasticity test attests to the validity of the specifications as well as the unbiasedness and the efficiency of 
the estimates. Additionally, the LM serial correlation test and the correlograms lead us to believe that the residuals are 
serially uncorrelated. The AR roots graph indicated that all the variables in VAR were stationary as all the characteristic 
roots are less than unity, that is, they lie inside the unit circle. 
.  
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The tests for the joint significance of the VAR coefficients show that they are strongly jointly 
significant at the 1% level. When tested separately coefficients at both lags in the GDP equation are 
significant at the 1% level: the p-value is 0.000 and 0.004 respectfully. 
Granger causality Wald tests indicate that lagged remittances growth can be used to predict the 
growth of Belarusian GDP (p-value is 0.021) but not vice versa. As signs of the VAR model’s 
coefficients show, starting from lag 2 remittances growth negatively affects GDP. These coefficients 
are used to graph Impulse Response Functions (IRF) showing the effects of shocks on the adjustment 
path of the variables (depicted in Figure I217
Examining of the IRF indicates that remittance inflows are strongly autoregressive over the 
forecast horizon. Series are stationary and therefore shocks are not persistent; their effects almost 
disappear by the eighth quarter. Quadrant 2 (northeast) of the IRF displays the response of the cyclical 
components of remittances to a one standard deviation shock of the cyclical components of Belarusian 
GDP. It is positive during two quarters and then dies out, indicating mild, though not statistically 
significant, pro-cyclicality of remittances and GDP. Quadrant 1 (northwest) is of most interest for us – 
we can see that shocks to the remittances create a smaller, but statistically significant response in 
GDP. This part of Figure I2 shows that GDP responds negatively to shocks to remittances in the 
second and subsequent quarters. GDP recovers from the shocks to remittances, but only reach its 
initial level (value before the shock) after about 8 quarters. 
).  
As expected, remittances responded by immediately spiking, then dropping sharply after two 
quarters, and settling at the initial level by the end of forecast horizon (see Quadrant 3 in the Figure 
I2). This could indicate that remittances have their own built-in force that drives their growth. 
The forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) presented in the Figure I3, measure the 
contribution of each type of shock to the forecast error variance. Table I7 shows the variance 
decomposition of remittances over eight quarters. The results indicated that remittances accounted for 
most of the variability in itself – from 98.9% in the second quarter to 82% in the eighth. GDP 
accounted for, on average, 12.5% of the innovations in remittances. This result confirmed the findings 
of other authors (e.g. Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006), who indicated that host country determinants 
are more important in explaining remittance flows. 
The last conclusion remains unchanged after adding Russian GDP as a third variable in the VAR 
model18
Overall, having analyzed VAR results we can come to the following conclusions addressing our main 
hypotheses. First, the fact that remittances respond positively to the shock in Russian GDP confirms our 
expectations. That is, remittances should increase with the increasing income of migrants and of 
temporary workers, who increase in number when Russian GDP grows. Equally, a reduction in the 
income generating potential of migrants would lead to a reduction in remittances to Belarus. It is not 
surprising, then, that the inflow of remittances is strongly pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP. 
 (Table I8). However, then Russian economic growth becomes the factor, explaining most of 
the remaining variability of remittances inflow to Belarus: on average, 9.5%, compared to 0.9% of the 
innovations in remittances explained by Belarusian GDP (see Table I9 and Figure I4). The rise in 
remittances due to shocks to Russian GDP is larger than the increase experienced by remittances 
caused by positive shocks to Belarusian one.  
                                                     
17 We do not interpret the magnitudes of the VAR coefficients, as coefficients on successive lags tend to oscillate and 
complicated cross equation feedback may exist (Sims, 1980). Figure consists of a solid line in the gray area, representing 
a 95 percent confidence interval. The time horizon is 8 quarters. 
18 VAR(2) coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. Sign of the coefficient before remittances again shows that at 
lag 2 remittances growth negatively effects Belarusian GDP (p-value is 0.013). Granger causality Wald tests indicate that 
lagged remittances growth helps predict growth of Belarusian GDP (p-value is 0.040) as well as Russian GDP (p-value is 
0.009); Russian GDP Granger-causes Belarusian GDP (p-value is 0.027). The lagrange-multiplier test shows the absence 
of autocorrelation at lag order 2. 
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Second, contrary to our observation based on annual data, an analysis of quarterly data shows more 
variation in the series and remittances appear to be slightly pro-cyclical with respect to Belarusian GDP. 
In any case, remittances tend to eventually stabilize at their original levels: in this respect, 
macroeconomic shocks do not appear to have a persistent effect. This may indicate that remittances per 
se are more a concomitant result of economic system, reflecting some fundamental characteristics of 
labour market institutions, rather than a by-product of temporary economic crisises. Third, we cannot 
consider remittances as a decisive driver of economic growth in Belarus. Remittances support GDP 
growth immediately after flowing into the country, possibly by increasing domestic private consumption. 
But after two quarters GDP responds negatively to their growth. This may be explained by possible brain 
drain effects and decreasing productivity due to lower return on remaining human capital. The reason 
economic activity declines in response to remittances could also be explained by the loss in external 
competitiveness due to Dutch Disease effects (see the next section).  
b. Remittances and foreign exchange 
Remittances have become an important source of foreign exchange and financing for many developing 
countries (Vargas Silva, 2012). The impact of remittances on the foreign exchange in the CIS is very 
high due to the large quantity of labour migrants (up to 30 million in the region) (Canagarajah and 
Kholmatov, 2010). For a number of low-income states such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, 
remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange, helping these countries to reduce their account 
deficit and to pay for imports (Kupets, 2012).  
It is worth mentioning that the balance of payments model holds that a foreign exchange rate must 
be at its equilibrium level - the rate which produces a stable current account balance. A nation with a 
trade deficit will experience a reduction in its foreign exchange reserves, which ultimately lowers 
(depreciates) the value of its currency. A large inflow of remittances can compensate for the trade 
deficit and contributes to an appreciation of the national currency. 
In the balance of payments of the Republic of Belarus for 2012, the net inflow of remittances 
totaled 821.7 million USD (1.3% GDP), gross revenue volume made up 948.5 million USD (1,5% 
GDP). Table 4 shows that the remittances share in the current account balance varies significantly: 
they range from 7.1 % to 23.5 % of country’s deficit, 2006-2011. In 2012 remittances share in 
Belarusian current account deficit reached 52.1%, the maximum recorded since 2012.  
We have previously estimated that the real volume of remittances is twofold higher than figures 
provided by balance of payments. This can be additionally confirmed by examining the balance of 
cash foreign exchange by households, which has been persistently positive since the end of 2011. As 
one can see from the Figure 9, this is a first in the 2005-2012 period. 
It is interesting to note that remittances inflows, according to the balance of payments statistics, 
comprise only 14.3% on average in relation to total foreign currencies sales by households in 2012 
(Appendix J). This shows the level of the dollarization of the Belarusian economy but, at the same 
time, at least part of this gap can be sourced by unrecorded inflows of remittances. Even in the second 
and third quarters of 2011, when a sharp deficit of foreign currency had occurred, households sold 2.5 
times more foreign currency than the volume of remittances inflows. This took place in spite of the 
fact that the official exchange rate was 2-3 times lower than the market one. 
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Table 4. Selected indicators of current account and foreign exchange, 2005-2011 
 Indicator  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current account balance (mln. 
current USD) 435.5 -1448.4 -3039.7 -4988.1 -6177.8 -8277.7 -5026.2 -1819.3 
Net trade in goods and 
services (mln. current USD) 341.8 -1531.5 -2799.0 -4608.3 -5568.5 -7454.6 -1181.0 2936.1 
 Net trade in goods (mln. 
current USD) -637.6 -2269.0 -4041.8 -6236.8 -6957.0 -9077.6 -3466.8 497.5 
 Goods exports (mln. current 
USD) 16108.8 19834.7 24361.7 32804.7 21360.7 25405.1 40927.6 45506.3 
 Goods imports (mln. 
current USD) 16746.4 22103.7 28403.5 39041.5 28317.7 34482.7 44394.4 45008.8 
Consumer price index (2005 = 
100) 100.0 107.0 116.0 133.3 150.5 162.2 248.5 397.1 
Real effective exchange rate 
index (2005 = 100) 100.0 97.0 91.4 90.3 88.7 83.7 72.5 73.5 
Official exchange rate (BYR 
per USD, period average) 
2153.8 2144.6 2146.1 2136.4 2793.0 2978.5 4 975 8 336 
Remittances inflow (mln. 
current USD) 254.6 339.8 354.2 679.8 588.8 589.2 845.5 948.5 
Remittances as a share of 
current account balance, % 58.5 -23.5 -11.7 -13.6 -9.5 -7.1 -16.8 -52.1 
Remittances as a share of 
goods imports, % 1.5  1.5  1.2  1.7  2.1  1.7  1.9 2.1 
Source: NBRB data, author’s calculations. 
Figure 9. Remittances inflows and balance of cash foreign exchange  
by households in 2005-2012, mln. USD 
 
Source: NBRB data 
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When a country is strongly dependent on remittances, it is possible that with remittances growing 
there will be serious appreciation in the national currency exchange rate (Dutch disease). This might 
have a negative impact on the economy development (Rao and Hasan, 2012). While it most often 
refers to natural resource discovery and a subsequent large inflow of foreign currency, the mechanism 
of Dutch disease is the same in case of remittances. An increase in revenues from labour migration 
makes national currency stronger compared to that of other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), 
resulting in the nation’s other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, making, in 
turn, the exporting sectors less competitive19
In a recent study, using disaggregated sectorial data for developing and transition countries, Lartey, 
Mandelman and Acosta (2012) reveal two characteristics of the phenomenon known as “Dutch 
disease” activated by remittances inflows. They show that rising levels of remittances have spending 
effects that may lead to real exchange rate appreciation, and resource movement effects that favor the 
non-tradable sector at the expense of tradable goods production. In general, this disease is found in 
low-income and relatively closed economies that are highly dependent on remittances. Some 
symptoms of the Dutch disease have been found in Moldova and Armenia, but not in Tajikistan 
(Roberts and Banaian, 2004). 
. 
Observation of the annual data allows us to hypothesize that in Belarus there are no symptoms of 
the Dutch disease, conditioned by the growth in remittances sent to the country. One sign, which 
demonstrates this is that the share of the service sector in GDP (its growth often serves as an indicator 
of the “Dutch disease”) has been quite stable over the last 20 years (Appendix K).  
Analysis of the VAR(2) model describing relations between remittances and REER attests that 
coefficients are jointly significant at the 5% level. Results of the regressions show that growing 
volume of money sent home by migrant workers and migrant transfers is associated with the 
depreciation of Belarusian national currency: the coefficient at lag 2 is negative (p-value is 0.074)20
Granger causality Wald tests indicate that remittance inflows cannot be used to predict real 
effective exchange rate, but instead lagged REER helps predict growth of remittances inflow (p-value 
is 0.077). In short, when devaluation takes place in Belarus more people go abroad to support their 
families and more transfers from abroad come in. Indeed, IRF shows that an exchange rate shock leads 
to an increase in remittances inflow in the next quarter (Figure I5). Shocks are not persistent; their 
effects decrease in a quarter and disappear within a year. 
. 
One possible explanation is that, in fact, remittances do not compensate the trade deficit. It is not only 
because these are not large amounts, but also because most recipients of remittances may use these 
resources for consumption, buying mainly imported goods: this is implicitly confirmed by a negative 
correlation between remittances inflow and REER starting at lag 2. This leads to a further decrease in 
the real effective exchange rate of the national currency. However this explanation does not clarify 
causal relationships. 
Thus, we can further argue that this is high inflation (Table 4) that causes depreciation in national 
currency in relation to the currencies of Belarus’ trading partners. Inflation as a result of an 
unbalanced economic policy in case of highly opened Belarusian economy automatically leads to 
devaluation (see next section). The cheaper currency makes Belarusian exports including labour 
resources more affordable on the global market, while making imports more expensive. Toughening 
budget constraints and international competition do not allow exporting sectors to absorb the 
unemployed as before and labour migration increases.  
                                                     
19 It will be recalled that the interpretation of the effective exchange rate is that if the index increases, the purchasing power 
of that currency is higher (the currency strengthened against those of the country’s trading partners). A lower index 
means that the currency depreciated (devaluation) so that you need more of that currency to pay for imports. 
20 The coefficient at lag 1 is positive but statistically not significant. 
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c. Remittances and inflation  
Modeling the influence of remittances on consumer prices is problematic in technical terms. CPI 
seems to be non-stationary (see Figure I1) and if this is the case conventional hypothesis tests, 
confidence interval and forecasts can be unreliable. Indeed, the Dickey-Fuller test statistic shows that 
the inflation series have a unit root. Taking the first difference in the variable does not help to 
eliminate non-stationarity: the CPI series is stationary only in third differences. This allows us to grasp 
the presence of a deterministic trend in the series which is a non-random function of time. In the case 
of quarterly inflation in Belarus, 2005-2012, this trend seems to be nonlinear, so that inflation rises per 
quarter by several percentage points and this grows over time. The presence of a deterministic trend in 
the inflation series in Belarus supports our conclusion about a strong connection between rising prices 
and economic policies. 
The EG-ADF test suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) shows that inflation and remittances 
series do not share a stochastic trend. Apart from a deterministic trend which means the modeling of 
inflation is not quite appropriate we can detect in the inflation series a second type of nonstationarity: 
regression function changes over the course of the sample indicating the strong influence of changes 
(breaks) in economic policy. The p-value of the Chow test is < 0.001 and we can reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative that there is a break21
In December 2010 the average wage in Belarus was 530 USD. The policy of printing money, 
which is a permanent feature of the economic cycle driven by the execution of administrative 
economic targets in Belarus, resulted in an inflation rate of 108% in 2011 and the devaluation of the 
Belarusian ruble by more than 189% (Table 4). In November 2011, according to official statistics, the 
average wage was just 280 USD (Appendix L Figure L1). Outside Minsk and other big cities wages 
were even lower.  
. A short description of this break’s 
influence follows. 
In these circumstances low income workers were the primary target of economic support. Given 
comparatively low income differentiation and wage leveling (the Gini coefficient was 0.284 in 2011) 
qualified workers and high level specialists felt their income position became worse than average. In a 
sense this is an inherent characteristic of existing economic institutions in Belarus – to trigger 
mechanism of indexation of minimum consumer budget and minimum wage as a form of social 
support: for example, in 2010-2011 the minimum wage increased from 20% to 37% of average wage 
in the economy (see Figure L2). It is important part of the welfare system but during economic crises 
it works as a factor that pushes labour migration of highly-skilled workers rather than low skilled 
factory and farm workers who feel more protected. Even those who work in the prestigious banking 
sector, in enterprise management or in the media realize that they lack opportunities for professional 
development and cannot afford a good lifestyle. The lack of career opportunities leads to a brain drain 
of talented youth and this increases the opportunity costs of labour migration. 
Adding CPI in third differences into the VAR(2) model of remittances and REER makes the 
conclusion that lagged REER Granger cause growth of remittances even stronger (p-value is 0.051)22
                                                     
21 We examine whether a particular date (2nd quarter of 2011 when high inflation has started) causes a break in the 
regression coefficients. 
. 
Wald tests also indicate that lagged remittances help predict CPI change, though at only a marginal 
level (p-value is 0.077). In the equation for CPI as a dependent variable (see Table I10) the sign of the 
coefficient before remittances at lag 1 is positive but not statistically significant; the sign at lag 2 is, 
surprisingly, negative (p-value is 0.024) which means that remittances growth leads to a decrease in 
CPI. We can interpret this in two ways. First, during the crisis private consumption freezes and this 
leads to price level stabilization. Growing remittances are simply used to compensate a decrease in 
22 VAR(2) coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. Lagrange-multiplier test shows the absence of autocorrelation 
at chosen lag order. 
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living standards. The second explanation is based on the assumption that remittance-receiving 
households have a high propensity to import: growing imports compete with domestic goods and 
producers are forced to reduce prices. Both explanations, taking into account the deterministic trend in 
inflation, may mirror the inflationary nature of GDP growth in Belarus. 
According to a research by the World Bank, a large volume of the remittances sent into a country 
may dramatically increase prices for non-tradable goods, such as real estate and land (Orozco, 2012). 
We can expect the same in Belarus, especially in the housing market, taking into account that 86.3% 
of respondents claim that labour migration improves housing conditions (Shakhotska, 2003). 
The price index on the housing market is calculated in Belarus starting from 2010 and this does not 
allow us to make any well-grounded conclusions about its dependence on remittances inflows. The 
comparison of the price index of the housing market and the CPI shows that growth in the housing 
market from 2009 was less significant (Figure 10). 
Figure 10. Price index on housing market (per square meter of total floor space of flats)  
and CPI, 2009=100 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Belstat data 
The data on the number of individuals (families) show that improving of housing conditions does 
not demonstrate a perfect correlation with remittances volume, though the trend of both is ascending 
(Appendix M Figure M1). At the same time the dynamics of remittances and housing stock are well 
matched (Figure M2). However, it is hard to designate remittances as the important driving force of 
demand on housing construction in Belarus. Research shows that at present in this sector a “pushing 
out” model is dominating when the volume and structure of additional housing construction is 
determined by government plans (Siniak, Valetka and Rusiyanov, 2010). In total during 2009-2012 
housing construction has absorbed 15-20% of national investments23
                                                     
23 It is worth noting that, for the first time, in 2010, the share of banking credits (53.3% against 44.3% in 2009) in total 
sources of housing construction exceeded the share of households funds (38.6% against 46.5% in 2009). In 2011-2012 
96-97% of housing credits were issued by state-controlled banks on preferential terms. Yet another 4.7% of total 
investment in housing stock construction is covered from expenditures of the consolidated budget. It is not surprising 
thus, that econometric analysis reveals a strong positive influence in inflation dynamics on housing construction that 
indicates the inflationary character of housing construction funding (Valetka, 2011). The detected negative influence of 
wages dynamics as the driver of households’ demand on the housing construction output can be explained as follows: 
increase in money emission is a common source of a government-led growth of wages and of investments’ acceleration 
in housing construction. For example, while real growth of wages in 2012 reached 121.9%, the growth rate of housing 
stock decreased to 81.8% of 2011 level. 
. Evidently, large-scale priority 
allocation of resources in housing construction is taking place at the expense of other economic 
Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Belarus 
CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 31 
activities; not least commercial credits for private businesses become more expensive. So there is a 
risk that the national economy’s diversification will slow and that existing imbalances will grow. 
Similar concerns are expressed in IMF (2011). Taking these side effects into account, it is suggested 
that a “pulling out” model would diversify risks and reduce alternative costs to residential investments: 
by a “pulling out” model we refer to one where the real estate market will play a proper role and 
supply will be guided by demand (Valetka, 2011). In this situation remittances could play a more 
significant role as a source of housing construction investment.  
Individual private ownership of land in Belarus has been possible since 2009, this direction of 
remittances use seems not to be popular. According to State Land Cadastre data, as of 1 January 2012, 
the total area of land in the country amounted to 207,598 sq km. Of this, land in private ownership of 
households represents about 0.4% of the total area of land in the country, and it is currently possible to 
transfer another 8% of the total area of land to private ownership24
d. Remittances, investment and financial development 
. Given the restricted supply of land 
for privatising and increasing demand for individual housing, in the near future we can expect land 
prices to appreciate, not least because of growing demand driven by remittances. 
In CIS countries most remittances are directed at everyday consumption rather than being invested in 
business. This tendency is observed all over the world (Cruz Zuniga, 2011). In case of the countries of 
Central Asia, a large portion of remittances are directed at the organization of weddings and other 
social costs (Thieme, 2012). 
Atamanov et al. (2009) suggest that poor investment and business climate countries is not 
conducive to the investment of remittances in most CIS countries. This reduces the potential 
contribution of remittances to the national economy investments, which would otherwise be very 
noticeable. In the CIS countries, most remittance recipients do not have a long-term strategy for their 
financial situation improvement by developing their own businesses – they try rather to overcome the 
existing social challenges and to improve living standards. A large part of the short- and long-term 
migrants seek primarily financial stabilization for their families, and only well-established permanent 
migrants have considerable financial resources that can be invested in their country (Roberts and 
Banaian, 2004). Given conditions in CIS countries, consumed remittances have an indirect positive 
impact on investments – they help to stabilize macro-economic development of the state, improving a 
number of indicators, important for foreign investors. Additionally, remittances have a positive impact 
on the accumulation of private capital (Orozco, 2012). 
The financial development of many CIS countries is seriously influenced by remittances: it is one 
of the most stable sources of revenues, coming from outside, which helps to finance imports and 
service foreign debt (Canagarajah and Kholmatov, 2010). Also, remittances are a less volatile source 
of external income and these have a strong impact on the reduction of the risk of financial crisis in the 
country (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). On the micro-level, the inflow of financial resources from 
outside the country helps people to overcome the lack of cheap credit, meaning loans can be made 
within their family or community (EBRD, 2006). In less-developed countries of the CIS, first of all in 
Central Asia, remittances promote financial literacy among the local population and positively 
influence the spread of the banking system in the country. 
The investment potential of remittances in Belarus is not very high, but it has grown over last two 
years (Table 5). In 2012 remittances comprised 2.6% of final household consumption expenditure and 
4.6% of gross capital formation.  
                                                     
24 In a referendum held 24 November 1996, citizens decided that the mineral, water and forest resources of the Republic of 
Belarus would be under exclusive domain and control of the State. Agricultural land is also publicly owned (see UNECE 
(2008)). Thus, over 90 per cent of land in the country is not in the market. The majority of legal entities hold the right to 
permanent, perpetual use of land. 
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There is no evidence that spending resources coming to Belarus in form of remittances is different 
from the common CIS pattern – these resources are likely to be directed at everyday consumption rather 
than being invested. In 2012 personal funds amount only to 6.8% (1260.4 mln USD) in the total structure 
of investments in Belarus (5.9% in 2011). We can assume that remittances make up an even lower share 
of this indicator, whereas their volume comprises over 75% of personal funds invested in 2012.  
Table 5. Household final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation compared to 
remittances volume, 2005-2012 
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Household final 
consumption expenditure 
(mln. current USD) 
15705.6 19026.3 23457.8 31571.0 27303.0 30436.7 33881.7  35886.4  
Gross capital formation 
(mln. current USD) 8597.9 11895.9 15435.4 22872.4 18365.5 22229.6 22761.5  20782.7  
Remittances inflow (mln. 
current USD) 254.6 339.8 354.2 679.8 588.8 589.2 845.5  948.5  
Remittances as a share of 
household final 
consumption expenditure, % 
1.6% 1.8% 1.5% 2.2% 2.2% 1.9% 2.5% 2.6% 
Remittances as a share of 
gross capital formation, % 3.0% 2.9% 2.3% 3.0% 3.2% 2.7% 3.7% 4.6% 
At the same time as one can see from Figure 11 remittances again became comparable to the FDI in 
2012,25
Despite substantial reforms one of the key reasons for the low rate of investments from remittances 
seems to be the comparatively unfavorable business climate in Belarus. Research shows that the need 
to find financial resources for business-related issues is declared by 21.4% of respondents 
(Shakhotska, 2003) and that share is decreasing: in 2010 only 16% of potential labour migrants saw 
migration as a source of investment in their own business in future (Artiuchin and Pushkevich, 2011). 
So remittances have limited power to act as an investment source for entrepreneurial activity.  
 as it was before 2007 (Figure 12). It is also worth noting that remittances surpass the increase 
in net external borrowing in the banking sector planned by the government for 2013 (900 mln. USD). 
Figure 11. FDI and remittances inflow in 2004-2012, mln current USD 
 
                                                     
25 The 2011 peak is explained by the 2.5 bln USD deal with “Beltransgas” shares bought by Russian “Gazprom”. 
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At the same time remittances may enlarge households’ savings and they may indirectly serve as a 
source of investment26. The growing gap between households’ savings in foreign and national 
currency (Appendix N Figure N1)27
At least partially we can address significant growth of households’ savings in foreign currency to 
NBRB policy. Further promoting saving accounts in foreign currency and cross-national banking 
would contribute to a substantial reduction in the level of transaction costs in sending remittances
 supports this assumption. The underlying cause for this widening 
gap can only partially be explained by national currency devaluation in 2011, when foreign accounts 
inflated as measured in the national currency. Thus, the increase of deposits in foreign currencies 
totaled 2065 million USD in 2012 (Figure N2). 
28
Our conclusion that remittances are invested only to a limited extent is in line with their weak 
influence on GDP. Thus, there is a need for effective policies to be implemented to channel 
remittances for investment purposes to support economic growth. However, the decreasing return on 
investment in Belarus (Lemeshevki, 2010) may reflect systemic imbalances in the capital market 
preventing the effective use of investment resources. 
.  
e. Remittances and employment 
Almost all the countries of the CIS region have been facing a problem of high unemployment: the 
broad migration of excessive labour resources to richer countries has partially helped to alleviate this 
problem (Makaryan, 2011). The principal positive effect of large-scale migration on the employment 
situation in the region consists in the fact that the leaving workers decrease the pressure on the labour 
market. Average wages shoot up and migrants pass their jobs on to less skilled individuals 
(Canagarajah and Kholmatov, 2010; Orozco, 2012). Given persistent unemployment, the loss of 
labour resources has rather low opportunity cost for the country (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). 
Although most remittances sent within the CIS are consumed and not invested, there is a direct 
positive impact of remittances on job creation in the region. Local consumption, driven by 
remittances, induces the growth of retail trade, construction and services. For example, in the case of 
the rural areas of Western Ukraine, remittances led to the quick development of local businesses and 
services (Kupets, 2012). 
At the same time, research (Thieme, 2012) shows that large-scale labour migration may seriously 
challenge the employment situation in many CIS countries, causing massive brain drain and for a 
chronic lack of skilled and unskilled labour. Then, in some countries, such as Moldova and Armenia, 
there is a direct relation between the growth of the volume of remittances and labour effort, which is 
caused by moral hazard (Hristev et al., 2009). Those regularly receiving remittances have less 
incentive to work for relatively small amount of money. Moral hazard seriously aggravates the lack of 
labour resources in the countries, where there is a substantial difference between the average wage and 
the size of remittances.  
Unlike the other transition countries, Belarus has, since 2005, never reported its official 
unemployment rate higher than 1.5%. At the end of 2012 the figure was only 0.5%. In reality, this rate 
                                                     
26 This does not gurantee the effective use of credits as the banking sector in Belarus is state dominated and a good deal of 
capital is redistributed via financing of state programs and privileged access to capital for state owned companies. 
27 To some extent this growing gap can indicate the underestimates in remittance inflows as well. 
28 Globally, sending remittances costs an average of 8.96% of the amount sent (see http://remittanceprices. worldbank.org). 
In some extreme cases, transaction costs on remittances have been estimated at 45% of the amounts remitted (direct fees 
for wire-transfers or money orders plus cost of currency exchange). According to the World Bank total average cost of 
transfers of money to Belarus from Russia in the third quarter of 2012 was 2.23 percent having grown from 2.19 percent 
in the first quarter. The cost is not high compared to the average world costs but it is one of the highest in CIS: higher 
costs are to be found in money transfers to Georgia (2.40%) and Kazakhstan (2.65%)).  
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has been higher, taking into consideration the hidden characteristics of Belarusian unemployment. The 
unemployment rate was 6.1% according to the last Census and 5.3% in 2012 according to the LFS (see 
Appendix C). 
After the new wave of labour migration of 2011-2012, the Belarusian economy faced a serious 
challenge in terms of the outflow of labour resources and a strong deficit of skilled workers. The most 
affected industries were construction, transport and health care. The growing gap between the average 
wages in Belarus and Russia has accelerated the outflow of labour resources from the country. At 
present, the deficit of labour resources in Belarus is starting to be a serious threat for economic growth. 
At first glance the socio-economic influence of labour migration on employment can be evaluated 
as being relatively positive. The possibility of working abroad begins to deal with the problem of 
excess employment in Belarus, especially in state owned companies. Thus, employers may have a 
chance to concentrate their minds on the increasing effectiveness of production which will increase 
labour productivity, wages and which will lead to higher employment levels in the future. At the same 
time, the government facilitates measures (lowering wage administration, encouraging flexible 
systems for labour remuneration, etc.) directed at helping companies keep their best employees.  
In the case of proper conditions, as we can understand from the labour supply model of 
immigration (Appendix O), remittances can shift income, and thus labour demand, from Russia as a 
main destination country to Belarus as a source country. When labour migrants in Russia remit a 
substantial portion of their higher incomes to home, then total demand for labour in Belarus might 
actually increase even though people leave the country. The demand curve for labour (see Figure O2) 
might, then, on balance shift upward rather than downward. 
In Belarus the second scenario is more credible, as, at least partially due to remittances, labour 
demand remains nearly unchanged despite the unfavorable situation in the economy. But it is hard to 
say to what extent the wages might rise (see Figure L1) without wages increasing in the public sector 
with a certain wage target. To some extent government interventions were a reaction to growing 
labour migration and a deficit of skilled specialists, especially in construction. 
At the same time, the pressure of wages on production costs can significantly undermine profits as an 
investment source. As the ratio between productivity growth rate and real wage growth rate depicts 
(Figure 12), this is a real challenge for policy to attain a balance between productivity growth and wages 
growth. Otherwise, it is hard to expect that employment growth rate will be positive over the mid term. 
Figure 12. Employment growth and the ratio between productivity and real wage growth in 
2010-2012, cumulative total 
 
Source: author’s elaboration and calculations based on Belstat monthly data. 
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The lack of investment resources can result in the inability to restructure or modernize capacities to 
react, in a timely fashion, to growing demand fueled by a remittances-led increase in disposable 
income. Thus, even if the fraction of income remitted back to Belarus is high, it is not assured that 
additional demand will be successfully met by domestic production, especially taking into account a 
relatively significant marginal propensity to import on the part of remittance receiving households. 
This is in line with VAR results indicating that remittances cannot be considered as a driver of 
economic growth in Belarus. Lower productivity may be explained by a decrease in those employed in 
more productive ages (Figure 13). For instance, the number of 40-49 years old employees has 
decreased since the end of 2010 by 82,000 (8.2%). At the same time the tendency of personnel to age 
is accelerating: the 55+ category has been the only category to grow since then. By the end of 2012 the 
share of working pensioners (retirement age in Belarus is 55 for women and 60 for men) had exceeded 
10% (Figure 14). 
Figure 13. Change in number of employed by age group in 2012 to 2010, end of year  
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on “Size, structure and occupational training of personnel” bulletin (Belstat). 
Figure 14. Employees’ average age and shares of aged employees in 2000-2012, end of year  
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on “Size, structure and occupational training of personnel” bulletin (Belstat). 
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Existing wage regulation is one of the reasons resulting in the depletion of skilled personnel and 
high employee turnover. In July 2011, as a result of wage-setting liberalization the single pay grading 
system ceased to be mandatory and was merely recommended. However, the single pay grading 
system is in force in the public sector where near 20% of all those employed in the economy are 
localized. Moreover, the pay system has recently become even more compressed due to imposition of 
adjusting coefficients to support workers in the lowest grades. This leads to voluntary termination of 
employment contracts by most valuable workers who may join the ranks of labour migrants or become 
self-employed. High employee turnover (the rate of labour turnover in Belarus has reached 27.3 per 
cent in 2012 being near or above 25 per cent over the last decade) has a negative impact on 
productivity, especially on state owned enterprises. 
According to World development report team’s estimates based on the 2010 Life in Transitions 
Survey, Belarus is among countries in the region with the highest preferences for self-employment. If, 
on average, about one-quarter of adults from 35 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia prefer 
self-employment, then, in Belarus, the share is surprisingly higher – 43% (World Bank, 2012). This 
indicates not so much the inability to find salaried employment as a readiness to leave current jobs 
because of insufficient wage conditions. To some extent the figure may mirror a potential for labour 
migration as well. 
High labour taxes in Belarus (the highest among CES countries) may also reduce labor demand and 
intensify the exit of workers from the labor market. This in turn limits economic growth in the face of 
reducing labour supply due to demographic reasons. 
f. Remittances and human capital formation 
The impact of remittances on human capital formation in the CIS region is in general rather favorable. 
Poor and middle income remittance-receiving families have more financial possibilities for providing 
quality education and medical care for their children. At the most fundamental level, remittances 
seriously improve the nutrition of children, especially in the poorest countries of the region: for 
example, in Tajikistan, see Azarri and Zezza, 2011. However, as some authors note, though 
remittance-receiving families are able to invest more in education, they tend to over-spend on the 
consumption of imported goods (Hristev et al., 2009). 
In general, remittances have positive impact on the financial literacy of the recipients, the level of 
education and medical service provided for children as well as the transfer of useful skills and 
experience to children (Orozco, 2012; Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). However, some studies of the 
relationship between remittances and education of children in the CIS region give different results. In 
the case of Tajikistan, one study showed a clear positive impact of remittances on school attendance, 
while another study claimed that there is positive relation between remittances and school absenteeism 
(Brown et al., 2008, Nakamuro, 2010). This contradiction proves that it is quite difficult to estimate 
the real impact of remittances on various social issues.  
In the case of Belarus there is some evidence that remittance receivers may direct a part of these 
resources to pay for education. Health care and recreation issues as important forms of human capital 
development are also important for a significant share of respondents (Table 2). Education-related 
issues as goals of labour migration were indicated by 52.1% of respondents (Shakhotska, 2003). This 
tendency is confirmed by the relatively high share of young people receiving a university degree in 
Belarus and the limited amount of full-tuitions: the share of students in public higher educational 
institutions who pay fees is substantial. Fee-paying students are heavily concentrated in fields of study 
such as management, economics and the humanities. 
In a recent study the wish to provide good education for children was declared by 31% of potential 
labour migrants from Belarus (Artiuchin and Pushkevich, 2011). This may indicate the worsening 
quality of education, especially in case of correspondence students, and its poor matching to the labour 
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market. Indeed, the quality of the educational system in Belarus is generally agreed to be questionable 
(see Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013). 
The growing share of employees with university degrees, accompanied by decreasing productivity, 
may imply over supply of graduates with higher education. For instance, since the end of 2010, the 
share of employees with university degrees has increased from 25.4% to 27.4% (Figure 15). It appears 
that higher education does not correspond to skills level: according to a recent survey, a typical 
potential labour migrant from Belarus is a man aged 30-49 with secondary or vocational education 
(Artiuchin and Pushkevich, 2011).  
Figure 15. Structure of employed by formal education level, end of year 
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on “Size, structure and occupational training of personnel” bulletin (Belstat). 
The flip side of remittances sending by temporary migrants would be social capital destruction, 
which in turn can negatively affect human capital formation. But, to our knowledge, there are no 
studies in Belarus indicating the aggravation of social problems, loss of social capital or deterioration 
in family ties as a consequence of labour migration. Instead, we can assume the presence of some kind 
of intentional specialization when a man working abroad raises family income that allows couple to 
provide for another child29
Of course, an analysis of micro-data based on migrants’ surveys is needed to allow us to draw the 
cause and effect conclusions concerning the influence of remittances on human capital development. 
Without such surveys we can only suppose that the influence of remittances on human capital in 
Belarus is rather positive. The general conclusion in the literature seems to be true for Belarus as well: 
remittances foster human capital formation, though, without substantial economic and social progress 
in these countries, children of temporary immigrants will have to migrate as their parents did.  
.  
 
 
                                                     
29 Aggregate level data provide some support for the hypothesis on the positive influence of remittances on fertility. Thus, an 
analysis for the 1996-2011 period shows that, while controlling for GDP, an increase in remittances inflow by 10% leads 
to total fertility rate increase of 2%. An increase in remittances has a negative impact at a divorce rate; however this 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
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g. Remittances, poverty and income inequality 
In general, remittances directly contribute to the reduction of poverty, providing financial resources 
for everyday consumption, education and medical service (Canagarajah and Kholmatov, 2010). 
Temporary labour migration of the head of the family is the quickest way to improve financial well-
being among those with a low-income in the CIS region. Having a migrant abroad, a poor-income 
family receives not only a sTable source of financial help, but also a type of social insurance, 
protecting them during the economic crisis in their country (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). Household 
budget surveys indicate that remittances constitute over 20 percent of the expenditure of households in 
the poorest quintile (Mansoor and Quillin2007). 
Remittances have contradictory effect on income inequality in the CIS countries. On the one hand, 
they give a chance to the poor to improve their financial situation by working in a more developed 
country. On the other hand, those families that are not able to send its member abroad find themselves 
in a negative economic situation. In addition, research shows that richer families tend to have a bigger 
chance to receive remittances, due to the high costs of migration, better qualifications and higher 
mobility (Uzagalieva and Menezes, 2009). All types of household benefit from remittances, but 
migrants from richer families have access to better jobs abroad (Atamanov et al., 2009). An example 
of the negative impact of remittances on income inequality is Moldova, where richer families may 
send their member to the EU and the migrants from poor-income families are able to work only in 
Russia (Atamanov et al,, 2009).  
In Belarus it is not possible to propose a proper analysis of remittances influence on poverty and 
income inequality as there are no individual data on remittances receiving households. The analysis 
below is based on aggregate data. 
It is worth noting that the level of poverty in Belarus is rather low compared to the majority of CIS 
countries (Figure 16). However, facts suggest that growing numbers of Belarusian workers are 
adopting migration-based coping strategies in response to the uncertainties and insecurities facing 
them, especially after the 2011 crisis.  
Figure 16. Poverty level in CIS countries 
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Source: World Bank Poverty and Equity Database. Data from following years: Belarus, 2011; Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, 2010; Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan, 2009. 
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In the case of Belarus remittances may help to reduce absolute poverty. The national absolute 
poverty level (Table 6) is defined as subsistence level budget30
Table 6. Population with per capita disposable resources below subsistence level budget  
by sex-age groups 
, which average monthly per capita 
volume equaled 98.6 USD in 2012.  
2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
41.9 12.7 6.1 5.4 5.2 7.3 6.3 
Source: HBS 
Poverty is higher in rural areas: according to HBS the share of rural population with per capita 
disposable resources below subsistence level budget equaled 11.5% in 2011 and 9.4% in 2012 (5.8% and 
5.2% respectively for urban areas).  Yet a significant number of Belarusian labour migrants areas 
are urban: as a rule, men maintain their families by working abroad. According to estimates based on the 
2009 Census micro-data (Chubrik and Kazlou, 2013), rural areas’ share in number labour migrants is 
lower than that in the total work force. Rural migrants comprise only 18.3% of working in Russia and 
10.7% of labour migrants working in other countries. It is in line with the official statistics of 
international emigrants: the average share of rural migrants was 17% in 2005-2010. Remittance-
receiving urban households may be out of poverty from the very beginning: for 15% of respondents 
labour migration was a strategy to fight poverty and for 22% it was a way to help relatives (see Table 2). 
Wage differences between big Belarusian cities and Russia are less than those between small 
Belarusian towns or rural settlements and Russia, so labour migrants from bigger cities more often 
choose non-Russian destinations to get a higher salary. Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) are correct then 
when they argue that external labour migration in Belarus is more an urban than a rural phenomenon.  
We can conclude, then, that in Belarus remittances’ impact on reducing poverty is limited to 
reducing absolute poverty. Consequently, we can assume that in Belarus remittances lead to an 
increase in inequality as better off urban migrants get richer faster than poorer rural people31
The latter is not a significant problem as measured on the basis of the Gini coefficient Belarus is 
characterized by lower inequality compared to peer countries (IMF, 2011). The Gini coefficient 
amounted 0.285 in 2012, remaining almost at the same level as in 2011 (0.284). The ratio of 
disposable resources of 20% of the group with highest resources to 20% of the group with lowest 
resources was equal to 4 in 2011 and remained unchanged in 2012: it was 3.9 in 2010. Relatively low 
inequality in Belarus was mainly achieved through strong GDP growth in the 2000s and high-scale 
redistribution policies. 
.  
As we noted in Appendix B, we can try using the item “Material aid from relatives and friends” 
provided by HBS, to make some estimates of remittances inflow to Belarus. The aggregate HBS data 
are depicted in Table 7. 
 
                                                     
30A subsistence level budget is the value of the subsistence level plus compulsory payments and contributions.Subsistence 
level is defined as a minimum set of material goods and services that are essential for ensuring the life activities and 
health of a person. Average per capita subsistence level budget for main socio-demographic groups is approved on a 
quarterly basis by the Government of the Republic of Belarus at prices of the last month of the quarter. 
31 There are also some groups of households that can hardly improve their financial situation by sending a migrant abroad. 
This is true for the most vulnerable groups to poverty – unemployed and economically inactive people (single mothers, 
members of the problem families etc.). As they are unable to get a job in Belarus it is hard for them to be successful 
abroad, so they are naturally excluded from labour migration. The same is true for pensioners, who do not get any support 
from their children. So there are certain parts of the low-income population of Belarus who are isolated from the receipt 
of remittances. 
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Table 7. The volume and share of “Material aid from relatives and friends”  
in total households’ incomes 
Year  
Monthly 
volume per 
households, 
USD 
Share in total 
incomes, % 
Share in 
money 
incomes, % 
Share of 
households 
reported about 
this type of 
income, % 
Monthly volume 
per households 
reported about 
this type of 
income, USD 
2010 28.5 4.9 5.2 58.6 48.7 
2011 21.4 4.6 4.8 54.6 39.1 
2012 27.8 4.7 5.0 53.6 88.2 
Source: HBS 
As one can see, volume of material aid in all households in 2012 stood at close to 28 USD per 
month. It is 3.2 times higher in households reported about this type of income (88 USD). In 2012 the 
share of such households was 53.6%. 
Material aid from relatives and friends, received by households, amounts to 1,290 million USD in 
2012. But it is pointless to offer conclusions based on that figure or even to compare it with 
remittances volume reported by NBRB, as it was distributed between almost two million households 
(according to Belstat in 2010 the total number of households in Belarus was 3717,000). There are no 
approaches to sort out households with labour migrants as Belstat does not provide information about 
the place of the respondent’s work: The BHS sample is not designed for the working age population 
and received answers are not representative. The share and number of aid receiving households, 
against expectations, decreased in 2011 crisis year and then, again, in 2012. So we cannot use the 
information about wage incomes of individual households’ members to estimate the volume or 
remittances. 
Thereby, at present, in Belarus, there are no appropriate data to assess remittances’ impact on 
households’ income and changes in income disparities accurately. Thus, efforts by the government and 
international organizations in Belarus are needed to launch specialized surveys and to demand studies 
on the whole spectrum of migration issues. The improvement in existing surveys (HBS and LFS) is 
highly advisable and timely, especially taking into account the common labour market development 
within CES. For instance, in Poland the HBS of 2008 was the first to identify all sources of foreign 
income (work, business, social benefits, transfers from other households, etc.) 32
h. Remittances and public moral hazard 
.  
Large remittance inflows, in many cases create serious threat of moral hazard for the governments of the 
CIS countries, as well as for the recipients of these remittances. A large volume of remittances ease the 
pressure on the government to implement necessary economic and social reforms (Canagarajah and 
Kholmatov, 2010): governments in the CIS region prefer to solve deep internal problems not by reforms, 
but by pushing the excess labour force into temporary migration. The revenues of the governments of the 
largest remittance-receiving countries (Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, and Moldova) directly depend on the 
volume of remittances (Pinger, 2009). In the case of these countries, remittances make a serious 
contribution to the growth of governmental tax revenues (primarily from VAT), as they boost imports 
and develop the non-tradable sector of economy (Kupets, 2012). The high rate of labour migration from 
these countries reduces political and social tensions and saves governments from social and political 
unrest. The governments of many CIS countries do not have any internal motivation to implement the 
                                                     
32 In Poland, estimates suggest that remittances reduce poverty by nearly 2 percentage points – from 19% (a hypothetical 
poverty rate assuming no remittances) to 17.1% (Barbone et al., 2012). 
Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Belarus 
CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 41 
necessary reforms. They know that the poor and unemployed, who are willing to improve the financial 
situation of their families, will emigrate to more developed countries.  
Additionally, large influxes of financial resources to the countries with undeveloped welfare 
systems create alternative welfare systems, based totally on remittances. The recipients of remittances 
are able to pay bribes for public services in education and health care system. The government cannot 
provide adequate quality of free public services and the system of informal pay develops as a result 
(Canagarajah and Kholmatov, 2010). 
In Belarus there are some distinct signs of the moral hazard phenomenon induced by 
remittances inflow, at least in the case of labour market policy. An almost costless stream of excess 
labour force for temporary migration to Russia has resulted in the failure to reform the unemployment 
security system and the education system, which is still badly matching labour market needs.  
Instead, growing labour force participation does not suggest that remittances create fewer 
incentives to be employed in the national economy (Table 8).  
Table 8. Economically active population and labour force participation rate in Belarus,  
average per year 
Year 
Economically 
active 
population 
total, th. 
Of which, th. Labour force participation rate 
(ratio of economically active 
population to working-age 
population), % 
employed 
unemployed registered with 
agencies for labour, employment 
and social protection 
2000 4 539.6 4 443.6 96.0 78.0 
2005 4 490.6 4 414.1 76.5 75.6 
2008 4638.1 4594.4 43.7 76.7 
2009 4 686.1 4 643.9 42.2 79.9 
2010 4 705.1 4 665.9 39.2 80.8 
2011 4 686.0 4 654.5 31.5 81.1 
2012 4 816.7 4 577.1 239.6* 85.4 
Source: author’s elaboration based on Balance of labour resources (Belstat). 
* The sum of registered unemployed (28,500) derived from LFS estimate of number of people not having a job and actively 
looking for work (211,100) – see Appendix C. 
High activity rates in Belarus are confirmed both by HBS and Census data: around 70% of the 
working-age population (15–64) are working or searching for a job and ready to start it within two 
weeks. The relatively low rate of inactivity can be explained partially by the vulnerability of the 
inactive population to poverty. Unemployment benefit is about 15% of the subsistence level budget; 
other allowances are comparable to income at the poverty level33
Another explanation is that despite rather high activity rates, the problem of dependants is 
periodically raised by the government. The volume of dependants decreases as one can see from the 
Appendix C. The most problematic from the government’s point of view is the item “Others”. This is 
calculated in the Balance of labour resources as the difference between labour resources and the 
employed population and all the items listed in the Table C1. This item has been decreasing since 
2005 – from 13.6 % to 7.6% of total labour resources in 2011. In 2012 it stood at 5.2% of total labour 
resources while excluding the number of unemployed according to LFS. Interestingly, LFS indicates 
that the labour market policy has been implemented so far in accord with the inaccurate calculations of 
economically active population – the latter “increased” by 2.8% in 2012 compared to 2011 (from 
4686,000 to 4816,000). 
.  
High activity rates and a full employment policy, pursued by the government, does not ensure the 
effective use of resources: see unsteady productivity dynamics on Figure 12. One rather rough 
                                                     
33 The significant exception is child-care allowance until the age of three years, which has been increased from 2013 to 35% 
of the average wage (from about 20% in 2012) as a reaction to the existing demographic situation. 
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comparison makes the quality of economic institutions in Belarus, notably labour market institutions, 
rather questionable: 1) in 2012 1.5% GDP growth was attained while having a “reserve” of 2.8% of 
economically active population (over 130,000); 2) remittances, amounting in 2012 to 1.5% of GDP, 
were generated abroad by 1.2% of economically active population (55,400 – see Appendix C). 
Remittances together with Russian economic support (new credits, banking sector investments and 
discounts to energy resources pricing) and significant policy efforts on the part of government have 
helped in smoothing down existing economic imbalances in the Belarusian economy: policy efforts 
include FDI and SME development promotion, cutting costs to reduce inflation, attempts to develop 
national qualification system, etc..  
Russian economic support may, to some extent, be treated as a form of investment in human capital 
since a lot of Belarusians enter the Russian labour market. Together with significant public investment 
in education, health care and public services in Belarus, Russian support creates more favourable 
conditions for human capital development. Political and economic patronage of the human-capital 
“oasis” in Belarus is totally in line with a wise if rather aggressive migration policy declared in the 
Concept of Migration Policy, approved by the Russian president in 2012. 
There is a need to take a strategic look at migration options in Russia too. At present migration 
issues are on the policy agenda only in a latent form and even the main direct and indirect causes and 
consequences of migration are not aware of. For instance, negative demographic tendencies and 
coming labour resources decrease were not taken into account until recent tensions with massive 
highly-skilled worker outflows to Russia. Modernizing Russia faces the same demographic trend and 
much needed external inflow of labour. It is not painless for Belarus because its economic growth 
demands a skilled labour force: e.g. in construction, transport, services, etc.. 
We find ourselves in agreement with Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Luecke (2013), who 
suggest that the so called Migration Lens should be part of macroeconomic and sectoral policy 
formulation in Eastern Partnership Countries. They advise an institutionalized “lens”, i.e. framing 
policies, with numerous consequences for migration should be implemented/facilitated by an agency 
empowered with sufficient clout among government organizations. Experience shows that sectoral 
policy discussions very often are dominated by domestic concerns and lobbying effort by different 
stakeholders, who may not be particularly interested in migration and its socio-economic effects. 
This is a good moment for Belarus to follow this recommendation. At the same time, though, it will 
prove a challenge to institutionalize the Migration Lens, making it an integral part of macro- and 
sectoral policies in Belarus: at present the main migration issues stand outside of the competence of 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. This ministry is responsible for labour market regulation 
while the Ministry of Internal Affairs executes the role of the main state agency in the domain of 
migration policy. It does not have the incentive to become a powerful advocate; an advocate that could 
help mediate among sectoral interests while maintaining a focus on migration strategy and on the 
implications of individual policy decisions on migration outcomes. 
Strategically, Migration Lens developing should help to overcome moral hazard generated by 
remittances and Russian support and proceed to a wiser and more effective policy. At present, 
notwithstanding the government’s strong focus on the high activity rates aimed to ensure full 
employment, overall, labour market institutions in Belarus appear not to be pro growth. We can go 
further, in fact, and state that inflexible labour market arrangements are, at least partially, responsible 
for the decreasing returns on capital in Belarus. This restricts the potential effects of remittances as a 
source of investment and further clarifies VAR results indicating the negative influence of any 
increase in remittances inflow on GDP growth in Belarus. 
We can describe the intuitive line of consequent causes and effects which embrace the main 
channels of influences transmitting from labour to capital market as follows: Policy of pay equity and 
administrative wage targeting, not exclusively in the public sector (relatively low return on human 
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capital) → Imbalances in functional distribution of incomes (the share of labour is growing) → Lower 
incentives for investors (especially given that cheap Russian energy rent is uncertain) → Lower 
demand for strong financial institutions and capital drain (to CES e.g.) → Weak capital market and 
financial institutions with state domination → Privileged access to capital for SOEs, high cost of 
capital for private firms → Lower rates of (middle run) economic growth (due to physical capital 
deficit) → Lower pro ductivity → Lower growth rates of wages → Excess employment results in 
further wage compression and lowering inequalities (even more lower returns on human capital) → 
Higher incentives to migrate (positive selection, including entrepreneurs with capital) →  Lower rates 
of long-run economic growth (due to a physical and human capital deficit). 
Therefore, the main challenge for Belarus in terms of an economic policy capable of achieving 
sustainable economic growth would be to adopt comprehensive structural reforms. These reforms 
would be able to improve resource allocation providing tight coordination between labour and capital 
markets changes. 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In general, remittances have a positive effect on the economic development of the CIS region, though, 
it also causes several negative things. Large-scale labour migration generating remittances helps 
alleviate the problem of unemployment. Remittances received from short- or long-term migrants have 
a direct positive impact on the growth of foreign exchange, consumption and economic development. 
Additionally, remittances help eliminate poverty and develop human capital. For the smallest and 
poorest economies – Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Moldova – remittances have become a key source of 
national income. For other CIS countries, that have a lower share of remittances in their GDP, they are 
also a way to support the national economy. Families of labour migrants prefer to spend the greater 
part of remittances on everyday consumption and they do not have a long-term investment strategy. of 
the vast majority of remittances to CIS countries come from the Russian Federation, which makes CIS 
labour migration very sensitive towards the Russian economy.  
Besides the positive impact of remittances on economic development in CIS countries, remittances 
also bring with them a number of negative consequences. First, there is the problem of the loss of labour 
resources, something that hampers the development of the national economy. Labour migration may help 
to overcome deep economic and social crisis, but without comprehensive economic reforms and 
significant improvement of social conditions in the country, temporary migrants may not return to their 
home country. The loss of its most active people might, of course, be very dangerous for long-term 
economic growth. A large share of remittances in the national economy results too in macro-economic 
problems, such as the Dutch disease and import growth. One of the most dangerous challenges, created 
by remittances, is the high risk of moral hazard for CIS governments. A growing number of labour 
migrants and their remittances decrease the pressure to implement economic reforms in their countries, 
something that seriously challenges the long-term development of the whole CIS region. 
In case of Belarus, in comparison with the CIS as a whole, and especially in comparison with 
countries such as Moldova, Tajikistan or Armenia, the impact of remittances on economic development 
is not very high. In 2012 remittances stood at 1.5% of GDP, though the real contribution by our 
estimates is significantly higher – 2.8-3.6%. After the serious financial crisis of 2011 the number of 
labour migrants from Belarus increased rapidly, which resulted in the growing impact of remittances on 
the national economy. Remittances’ positive impact on economic development balanced the current 
account, improving the situation in relation to unemployment and household consumption.  
VAR modeling allowed to confirm one of our main hypotheses – inflow of remittances is strongly 
pro-cyclical with respect to Russian GDP. Remittances rise with growing income of migrants and of 
temporary workers who increase in number when Russian GDP grows. Remittances appear to be 
slightly pro-cyclical with respect to Belarusian GDP. Macroeconomic shocks do not appear to have a 
persistent effect on remittances, which tend to eventually stabilize at their original levels. This may 
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indicate that remittances per se are more a concomitant result of economic system, reflecting some 
fundamental characteristics of labour market institutions, rather than a by-product of temporary 
economic crises.  
At the same time VAR results indicate that our second hypothesis is not true (or, at least, not 
entirely true) – remittances are not a driver of economic growth in Belarus. Remittances support GDP 
growth immediately after flowing into the country, possibly by increasing domestic private 
consumption. But, after two quarters, GDP responds negatively to their growth. This may be explained 
by brain drain effects and decreasing productivity due to lower return on remaining labour resources 
and high personnel turnover. 
The negative influence of remittances on GDP is not caused by Dutch disease and inflation: 
exchange rate appreciation and growth in consumer price are not induced by remittances. Instead, 
lagged REER devaluation Granger causes growth in remittances inflow: when in crisis time 
devaluation takes place in Belarus more people go abroad to support their families and more transfers 
come from abroad.  
There is some evidence that the negative impact of remittances on growth in Belarus may be 
induced by a growing deficit of skilled labour: the brain drain effect. This may create a serious 
challenge to the long-term economic development of the country. Taking this into account, a 
conclusion can be drawn that research on migration issues and their impact on the country’s economy 
in Belarus is insufficient. In addition, there is the need to collect data and to develop statistics on 
migration and remittances which will serve as a basis for appropriate policy measures elaboration. 
Based on our study and our existing experience we can consider some modest recommendations for 
policy improvement in Belarus. 
1. There is a need to build the capacity of institutions and human resources to conduct research 
into the whole spectrum of remittances and labour migration issues in accordance with 
international standards. The collecting and the use of disaggregated population data for the 
development of socio-economic policies and programs is inadequate. Given the open borders 
between Belarus and Russia and the resulting free movement of people it is necessary to 
conduct regular household and individual surveys on migration issues to help with the 
employment of Belarusians abroad. Household and individual surveys on migration issues 
can supplement official sources based on the balance of payment statistics providing 
important information on: who remits and who receives remittances; how much and through 
which channels; and how remittances are spent by receiving households. 
Apart from this, it is necessary to collect information on the gross volume of physical 
persons’ remittances directly from the money-order systems, including data from the 
Belarus post service. The wide exchange and verification of information at the interstate 
level is needed, especially in CES and CIS. 
2. To increase remittances contribution to the economy it is important to keep remittances 
facilitation (namely low transaction costs, growing financial literacy and widening set of 
financial instruments for households) on the policy agenda in Belarus. Government should 
not try to control remittances and their receivers, but rather they should let migrants remit 
without restraints. The free flow of remittances will allow these transfers to adjust to cyclical 
fluctuations in the Belarusian economy in a manner that has positive implications for 
economic stability. The best way for policy makers to encourage the productive investment 
of remittances is to pursue macroeconomic policies that yield a stable and propitious 
investment climate. The government should spend on designing specific institutions that 
make investments more attractive.  
Specific objectives and measures of remittance facilitation policy are presented in Appendix 
P. We would suggest that all these measures should be taken into account, but especially 
those facilitating investment. To channel remittances for investment purposes the 
Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Belarus 
CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 45 
government could institutionalise a centralised remittance bureau, whose mandate would be 
to promote the use of remittances for economic development. For instance, this bureau could 
offer a tax concession for remitters investing in bond and stock markets and cheaper credits 
for business purposes. To qualify for these benefits, migrants or their families would have to 
submit proof of sending/receiving remittances. This mechanism can be a good point to start 
engaging in the economic development of the diaspora’s financial potential, something 
almost totally ignored so far. 
3. Government should design and implement a Migration Lens framework as a part of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies. While designing this approach it should recognize that 
there is a need to implement and facilitate migration-focused policies by an agency 
empowered with significant influence among government organizations. This agency should 
be in possession of evidence-based policy instruments, supported by expert knowledge and 
sufficient data.  
The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection together with Ministry of the Economy should, 
whether or not they are the main mediators of national migration strategy, make significant 
efforts to improve labor market institutions in Belarus. This means: the comprehensive 
reforms of wage regulation and qualification system; labour taxes and pension system; 
unemployment security system; and institutions of socially responsible restructuring . The 
first step in this list should be the continuation of the wage-setting liberalization started in 
2011: the compressed grading pay system still mandatory in the public sector should be 
abolished together with changes in a set of other regulations necessary to allow increased 
wage differentiation. This will make remittances friendlier to economic growth. 
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Appendix A 
Differences in wages, GDP per capita and inequality in CES countries 
Table A1. Wage levels in CES-countries in 2010 and 2011  
Country 
PPP units of 
national currency 
for one US dollar 
Exchange rate, 
units of national 
currency for one 
US dollar 
PPP Coefficient 
Nominal 
accrued wages 
payable of the 
workers in 
current US 
dollars 
Nominal 
accrued wages 
payable of the 
workers in PPP 
US dollars 
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Belarus 1248.26 1946.9 3000 5063 0.416 0.385 415.4* 343.4 998.6 892.0 
Russia 20.187 22.812 30.75 29.4 0.656 0.776 681.5 807.3 1038.9 1040.3 
Kazakhstan 110.448 121.652 147.42 146.6 0.749 0.83 526.6 613.7 703.1 739.4 
* Statistics Department EEC UN. 
Table A2. Differences in GDP per capita and Gini coefficient among Belarus and Russia 
Year 
GDP per capita in 
current USD Gini coefficient 
Ratio of 
GDP per 
capita in 
current 
USD, 
Russia to 
Belarus 
Ratio of Gini 
coefficients, 
Russia to 
Belarus 
Ratio of 
GDP per 
capita 
based on 
PPP, 
Russia to 
Belarus 
Russia Belarus Russia Belarus 
2005 5 313.1 3 098.2 0.409 0.256 1.71 1.60 1.38 
2006 6 912.9 3 805.0 0.415 0.262 1.82 1.58 1.36 
2007 9 101.6 4 672.4 0.422 0.274 1.95 1.54 1.35 
2008 11 630.6 6 385.6 0.421 0.274 1.82 1.54 1.27 
2009 8 567.9 5 179.9 0.421 0.268 1.65 1.57 1.17 
2010 10 674.3 5 824.4 0.421 0.265 1.83 1.59 1.13 
2011 13 335.0 6 332.1 0.417 0.284 2.106 1.468 1.11 
2012 14 246.8 6 739.4 0.420 0.285 2.114 1.474 1.13 
Source: World Development Indicators, Belstat, Rosstat. 
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Appendix B 
Other sources of data for remittance volume estimates 
i. Census data 
The population census in Belarus in the framework of the 2010 Population Census Round was 
conducted from October 14 to October 24, 2009. It was the second census in the history of 
independent Belarus. The census form in 2009 includes 37 questions, the responses to which would 
allow us to have detailed demographic, national, cultural and socio-economic description of the 
population. 
As compared to 1999 the census programme had additional questions concerning the migration of 
the population – place of birth and continuity of residence in a settlement. The questionnaire contains 
a question about the work place of the employed population with 15 years old and over34
ii.  Household Budgetary Survey data 
. The number 
of people with workplaces located in other countries allows scholars to estimate the scope of labour 
migration and its geography.  
A similar question about workplace location is included in the Household Budget Survey (HBS 
hereafter), however in this case the names of the countries are not indicated35
At the same time HBS provides the information which can be used to estimate indirectly remittance 
volumes. For this purpose one can use data on transfers from relatives and friends who do not live 
with other household members: “Material aid from family members and friends”.  
. HBS, which has been 
surveyed since 1995, is the only source of labour-market related information. However, its 
questionnaire and samples are designed for households’ living standards analysis, not for the analysis 
of the economic activity of household members. 
iii.  Labour Force Survey data 
Labour Force Survey was launched only in 2012 and its results have not been published yet. The LFS 
questionnaire36
 
 repeats the same question from Census 2009 about the place of work. The 
questionnaire is designed for representation and analysing the economic activities of labour force. 
Labour migration can be studied in detail using LFS data, such as educational level, occupational 
distribution and employment conditions. But again the LFS does not contain questions about labour 
migrants’ incomes, so this survey is not a source of information on remittances in Belarus. 
                                                     
34 See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/main4b.php.  
35 The full questionnaire can be accessed at http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/households/3.php. The official name of the survey 
is Household Living Standards Survey. The survey coverage is about 6,000 households annually according to the 
methodology complying with international standards. The survey is carried out in all regions of the Republic of Belarus 
and Minsk City covering 49 cities, towns and urban-type settlements as well as 53 rural Councils. See also 
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en /households/main1.php.  
36 See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/households/4-t.pdf. In 2012 and 2013 the quarterly survey coverage was about 7,000 
households selected during drawing the sampled population. 
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Appendix C 
Labour resources in Belarus 
Table C1. Labour resources in Belarus according to the Balance of labour resources (th people, 
average per year) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Labour resources – total 6106.1 6107.7 6109.9 6108.1 6081.4 6070.6 6031.4 6030.4 
from which:         
employed population 4414.1 4470.2 4518.3 4610.5 4643.9 4653.4 4654.5 4577.1 
other employable population in 
working-age 1692.0 1637.5 1591.6 1497.6 1437.5 1417.2 1376.9 1452.9 
from which:         
students enrolled not combining 
work with study 608.6 605.1 595.4 588.9 582.2 554.9 531.9 497.4
2) 
citizens retrained on assignment 
of agencies for labour, 
employment and social 
protection 
… … … 7.8 8.3 8.4 6.3 …1) 
officially unemployed 76.5 64.2 48.6 43.7 42.2 39.2 31.5 28.5 
people not having a job and 
actively looking for work … … … … … … … 211.1
2) 
workers on maternity leaves 
and child-care leaves until the 
age of three years 
148.3 151.5 160.2 214.0 222.4 228.3 240.0 272.52) 
citizens receiving allowance for 
care for the elderly and disabled 
adults and children 
… … 29.7 32.0 38.6 46.0 51.3 58.3 
citizens imprisoned 16.7 17.0 17.5 18.6 21.2 21.3 18.7 16.2 
citizens employed abroad … … … … … … 41.83) 55.42) 
housekeepers … … … … … … … 130.82) 
people believing that it is 
impossible to get a job … … … … … … … 42.0
2) 
people not having a need or 
desire to work … … … … … … … 30.2
2) 
others 841.9 799.7 740.2 592.6 522.6 519.1 455.4 110.5 
Note. 1) Included in item “Students enrolled not combining work with study”; 2) According to LFS; 3) According to Census 2009. 
Source: Balance of labour resources, Belstat. 
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Appendix D 
Labour migration profile according to Census 2009 data 
The description of the Belarusian profile of the labour migration presented below is based on recently 
published analyses of census 2009 data (see Bobrova, Shakhotska and Shymanovich, 2012; Chubrik 
and Kazlou, 2013). 
Age and Gender. Census data show that in temporary labour migration the number of men moving 
to other countries to work is more than 10 times the number of women which is especially true for 
Lithuania, Russia and Latvia: e.g. 90% of Belarusians working in Russia are men. T The USA and 
Germany do not support this tendency and the numbers in question for those countries are practically 
equal. Italy employs, meanwhile, mostly women – 76.1%, who work there in services, which explains 
men’s domination for employment in Russia and the Baltic states as they work there mainly in 
construction and transport sectors. 
Three quarters of Belarusian labour migrants are between 24 and 49 years old. The census shows 
that the average age of migrants varies according to the country of employment and by gender. The 
average female migrant is 35.2 and the average maile migrant 37.5 years old. However women 
migrating to Germany are 35.5 on average as that country offers better job opportunities for many 
women under 30, at least according to Census data. The average age for Belarusian women employed 
in Italy is 38.8, and in Lithuania 39.2 because the share of female migrants above 40 to these countries 
is respectively 48.7% and 45.5%. The explanation for this might simply lie in popularity among 
Belarusian women of such forms of employment as a housemaid, a job which gives a premium to life 
experience. The men migrating to Germany are on average 38.6: this ranges from 34.8 in Italy to 40.4 
in Lithuania. 
Education. The difference in education level among labour migrants is significant and varies 
according to the country of employment and by gender. The level of education of labour migrants 
differs greatly, depending on gender and the country of destination. The average educational level of 
female labour migrants is higher than that of their male counterparts. In particular, the general level of 
education of labour migrants to Russia was lower than the educational level of the average Belarusian 
work force. Half of those employed in Russia have only vocational, secondary or even lower levels of 
education. People with tertiary education form just 16.1% of labour migrants to Russia. (The average 
share of people with tertiary education working at the place of residence in Belarus is 25.3%). Most of 
the labour migrants with tertiary education move to the Czech Republic (37.7% of all labour migrants 
to the country), Italy (39.6%), Germany (55.2%), and the USA (71.7%). 
Occupation and economic activities. Most Belarusians were employed abroad in the construction 
sector (42% of all labour migrants). Employment in other sectors was rather low: 13% were employed 
in the transport and communication sectors, 8.1% in retail, 5.1% in manufacturing industries, 2.6% 
were employed in the real estate sector. A comparison of those employed in CIS and non-CIS 
countries reveals that employment in the construction sector is typical only for CIS countries (45.2% 
of labour migrants in these counties), while in non-CIS countries, only 8.3% of labour migrants are 
employed in this sector.  
Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) conclude that the occupational structure of demand for labour is largely 
determined by the economic incentives that migration offers: Russia is closer, but wage opportunities 
there are on average lower than in developed industrial economies. As a result, the share of highly-
skilled labour is two-fold higher among labour migrants to non-Russian destinations than among those 
who work in Russia (Table D1).  
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But in absolute terms Russia prevails again. At the same time skilled labour is dominant in both 
directions (about half of labour migrants to non-Russia destinations and 2/3 of labour migrants to 
Russia). As figures in Table D1 show, unskilled labour is also in higher demand in Russia than in 
other destinations. 
The highest demand in terms of types of occupation for non-Russian destinations is in “drivers and 
mobile plant operators” (skilled labour) and “administrative and commercial managers” (high-skilled 
labour), followed by professionals and associate professionals in business administration and related 
spheres (highly-skilled and skilled labour). About one third of labour migrants working in Russia have 
occupations in the category “Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians” (unskilled 
workers of similar occupations are also in high demand there); the next popular type of occupation is 
“drivers and mobile plant operators” followed by “administrative and commercial managers” (Table 
D1). The occupational structure of non-Russian labour migrants is much closer to that of the total 
work force. It means that Russian demand is more focused on specific occupations, while demand for 
other destinations is more diversified. 
Another view concerning foreign demand for labour is based on the distribution of labour migrants 
between economic sectors (economic activities). Here leading roles are played by construction (in the 
case of Russia) and transportation (in the case of other destinations) and this is even more evident than 
in the case of occupations (see Table D2). Trade is a popular sector across all labour migrants 
regardless of destination, as well as “Other community, social and personal services activities” and 
various sub-sectors of manufacturing. Education and health care have also attracted labour emigrants 
to non-Russian destinations – as Census 2009 data show, this sector in countries other than Russia has 
attracted more labour migrants than Russia even in absolute terms. 
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Table D1. Labour emigrants by occupation and skills (shares) 
Occupation (according to ISCO 08) Russia Other destinations 
Employed, 
total 
Administrative and commercial managers 8.8 10.7 11.4 
Other managers 1.0 1.9 1.5 
Science and engineering professionals 2.8 4.1 3.5 
Physical and engineering science technicians 1.6 0.5 2.2 
Health professionals 0.2 1.2 1.1 
Health associate professionals 0.1 1.7 3.2 
Teaching professionals 0.2 4.6 4.0 
Teaching associate professionals 0.1 0.5 1.2 
Business and administration professionals 1.0 6.1 3.4 
Business and administration associate professionals; Legal, 
social, cultural and related associate professionals; General 
and keyboard clerks; Customer services clerks 
2.3 7.3 9.0 
Personal service workers 2.2 5.8 7.1 
Cleaners and helpers 0.3 1.0 3.7 
Sales workers 2.5 2.4 4.1 
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers 0.2 0.2 3.4 
Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers 0.2 0.7 0.7 
Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians 30.1 3.6 5.5 
Mining and construction labourers 7.3 1.0 0.7 
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 7.9 1.7 9.2 
Handicraft and printing workers 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Electrical and electronic trades workers 1.1 0.0 3.0 
Stationary plant and machine operators 2.5 0.5 2.1 
Assemblers 1.0 0.5 2.8 
Manufacturing labourers 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Drivers and mobile plant operators 15.1 23.8 8.3 
Transport and storage labourers 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Commissioned armed forces officers 0.1 0.0 0.7 
Not defined (ND) 0.1 0.0 0.1 
No answer (NA) 10.6 19.4 5.8 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
By skills:    
High-skilled 14.1 28.6 25.7 
Skilled 66.9 48.8 61.7 
Unskilled 8.3 3.2 6.8 
NA/ND 10.7 19.4 5.8 
Source: Chubrik and Kazlou (2013). 
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Table D2. Labour emigrants by economic sector (shares) 
Economic sector (NACE Rev. 1.1 and Rev. 2) Russia Other destinations 
Employed, 
total 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.7 1.2 10.6 
Manufacturing 6.4 4.9 21.6 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.6 0.5 2.7 
Construction 47.2 6.3 8.5 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 8.8 9.5 11.9 
Accommodation and food service activities 1.0 4.1 1.2 
Transportation and storage 11.1 22.8 5.5 
Information and communication 0.2 0.2 1.3 
Financial and insurance activities 0.1 0.5 1.2 
Real estate, renting and business activities 2.7 7.0 5.2 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 0.2 0.5 3.1 
Education 0.5 7.3 9.5 
Human health and social work activities 0.4 3.9 6.7 
Other community, social and personal services activities, etc. 8.9 11.2 5.1 
NA 11.2 20.1 5.8 
Source: Chubrik and Kazlou (2013). 
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Appendix E 
Characteristics of labour migration in Belarus based on registered employment contracts, 2000-2012 
The overwhelming majority of official labour migrants leave Belarus in 2012 for work associated with 
manual labour (2,915), as qualified workers and specialists (1,583 people), service sector employees 
(1,611), for agricultural work (392) and as managers (33). 
According to CMD records, 2011 saw a growing tendency for foreigners to enter Belarus for labour 
activities in greater numbers. 8,434 foreigners came to the country in 2011(Table E1). However, the 
increase in 2012 compared to 2011 was rather modest: only 347 people (Figure E1). Beginning with 
2009 the number of labour migrants exceeds those leaving for labour activities in other countries on 
the basis of signed employment contracts (Figure E3).  
The major workforce suppliers to our country are: Ukraine (2854), China (1257), Lithuania (904), 
Uzbekistan (646), Turkey (544), Moldova (491), Latvia (315), Georgia (257), Armenia (202), 
Azerbaijan (154), Vietnam (153) and Poland (119) (see Figure E4). The foreigners in Belarus occupy 
themselves chiefly as construction workers, agricultural workers, cooks and coaches.  
The comparison of labour migrants’ age distribution in 2005-2010 shows that age structure of 
migrants arriving in Belarus is rather even, while among leaving labour migrants young people 
prevail: over 60% of them are less than 24 years old (see Figure E5 and Figure E6). This may indicate 
relatively low skills of workers leaving Belarus based on signed employment contracts (age of labour 
migrants is not provided by CMD after 2010).  
Table E1. The labour migrants exchange based on signed employment contracts 
 Number of labour migrants arriving in Belarus 
Number of labour migrants leaving 
Belarus 
Year total from Kazakhstan total to Kazakhstan 
2005 651 - 4222 - 
2006 922 - 4502 - 
2007 1496 10 7335 - 
2008 2463 30 6204 - 
2009 4835 56 4178 - 
2010 6816 51 5066 10 
2011 8434 68 5522 10 
2012 8781 - 6534 - 
Source: National Statistical Committee data and Citizenship and Migration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Republic of Belarus internal statistics 
Note: Citizens of the Russian Federation since 1999 and citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan since 01.01.2012 have been 
working in the territory of the Republic of Belarus without obtaining special permits and, consequently, are left out of 
account in the given data of the general number of labour-migrants arriving in Belarus for work on the bases of signed 
employment contracts. However, they enter general migration accounting.  
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Figure E1. The number of labour migrants arriving in and leaving Belarus based on signed 
employment contracts in 2000-2012 
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Figure E2. The share of labour migrants arriving in Belarus based on signed employment 
contracts in 2000-2012, by countries of arrival  
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Figure E3. The ratio of arriving /leaving labour migrants in Belarus in 2000-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Statistical Committee data and CMD internal statistics 
Figure E4. The shares of labour migrants leaving Belarus based on signed employment contracts 
in 2000-2012, by countries of leave  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Statistical Committee data and CMD internal statistics 
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Figure E5. The distribution by age of labour migrants arriving in Belarus in 2005-2010 
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Statistical Committee data (data are not provided since 2010) 
Figure E6. The distribution by age of labour migrants leaving Belarus in 2005-2010 
Source: Author’s calculations based on National Statistical Committee data (data are not provided since 2010) 
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Appendix F 
The estimation of number of illegal migrants working in Russia 
In their report “Labour Migration in Common Economic Space” (May 2012) the Integration Research 
Center of the European Development Bank evaluated the number of illegal labour migrants in Russia. 
The evaluation was done based on the 2010 data on foreign currency deductions made by the migrants 
to their homeland, average wage rate in Russia, cost of living index average value, and the number of 
officially working migrants. 
Table F1 shows the upper threshold of illegal migration if the migrants supposedly pass over only 
30% of their earnings to their families in the source countries.  
Table F1.The number of illegal migrants working in Russia (estimation) 
Source country 
Remittances 
received from 
Russia in 2010, m. 
US dollars 
Migrants working 
in Russia in 2010, 
estimates 
Migrants working 
in Russia in 2010 
officially 
Migrants working 
in Russia in 2010 
illegally 
Tajikistan 2032 926 162 268 632 657 530 
Kyrgyzstan 1160 528 714 117 656 411 058 
Kazakhstan  132 60 164 8 267 51 897 
Belarus 375 170 920 67 290 103 630 
Note: Calculations are based on the following figures. The 2010 average wage in Russia made up 20,383 roubles per month which 
in US dollar terms made $700 per month (by average rate 29.1 RUR/$1) and consequently $8,400 per year. The mean 2010 Russia 
cost of living averaged 6, 138 roubles. Hereby, with taxation rate 13% maximum savings would form $4780 per year.  
Source: The Integration Research Center of the European Development Bank 
The evidence of the fact that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan became unquestionable leaders of the 
currency remittances list convinced the authors of this report to include that in the years to come, 
ceteris paribus, the number of illegal labour migrants will have to grow namely from these two 
countries but not from Belarus and Kazakhstan.  
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Appendix G 
Workers’ remittances inflows and outflows in Belarus in 2011 and 2012 
Table G1. Workers’ remittances inflows and outflows in Belarus in 2011 and 2012 
Country 
2011 2012 
Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow 
th. USD % of total th. USD 
% of 
total th. USD 
% of 
total th. USD 
% of 
total 
Total 350 329.8 100.0% 106 477.1 100.0% 379 510.2 100.0% 110 918.7 100.0% 
Azerbaijan 288.3 0.1% 151.9 0.1% 1 196.5 0.3% 188.6 0.2% 
Armenia 133.2 0.0% 285.2 0.3% 303.5 0.1% 441.5 0.4% 
Georgia 280.9 0.1% 400.7 0.4% 558.5 0.1% 413.6 0.4% 
Kazakhstan 6 260.3 1.8% 891.7 0.8% 7 185.9 1.9% 1 027.8 0.9% 
Kyrgyzstan 339.3 0.1% 60.5 0.1% 275.8 0.1% 47.0 0.0% 
Moldova 386.7 0.1% 317.6 0.3% 249.6 0.1% 134.3 0.1% 
Russia 240 300.0 68.6% 14 000.0 13.1% 286 900.0 75.6% 19 600.0 17.7% 
Tadzhikistan 133.9 0.0% 161.1 0.2% 129.8 0.0% 46.2 0.0% 
Turkmenistan 5.0 0.0% 3.9 0.0% 24.9 0.0% 10.6 0.0% 
Uzbekistan 312.3 0.1% 106.0 0.1% 220.2 0.1% 70.2 0.1% 
Ukraine 4 750.7 1.4% 3 785.1 3.6% 3 216.3 0.8% 4 520.9 4.1% 
Latvia 13 503.6 3.9% 4 123.3 3.9% 6 219.2 1.6% 1 486.0 1.3% 
Lithuania 3 233.4 0.9% 4 515.0 4.2% 5 198.9 1.4% 7 090.8 6.4% 
Estonia 5 723.4 1.6% 1 096.8 1.0% 243.0 0.1% 317.6 0.3% 
USA 13 695.6 3.9% 14 719.3 13.8% 18 420.0 4.9% 22 266.7 20.1% 
Germany 4 630.1 1.3% 11 091.9 10.4% 4 012.2 1.1% 13 466.0 12.1% 
Canada 779.4 0.2% 4 342.4 4.1% 727.3 0.2% 3 586.9 3.2% 
Great Britain 2 999.5 0.9% 3 272.4 3.1% 2 273.2 0.6% 3 453.7 3.1% 
Italy 3 527.5 1.0% 2 345.7 2.2% 4 203.5 1.1% 1 749.5 1.6% 
Israel 1 072.0 0.3% 3 822.5 3.6% 932.2 0.2% 3 156.7 2.8% 
Switzerland 3 515.5 1.0% 989.7 0.9% 2 662.9 0.7% 386.6 0.3% 
Cyprus 1 427.9 0.4% 294.4 0.3% 971.9 0.3% 398.6 0.4% 
Spain 2 201.3 0.6% 4 933.7 4.6% 706.1 0.2% 2 350.2 2.1% 
France 17 804.6 5.1% 2 219.6 2.1% 16 947.9 4.5% 1 644.8 1.5% 
Poland 2 681.2 0.8% 3 579.9 3.4% 771.7 0.2% 1 363.9 1.2% 
Turkey 1 152.4 0.3% 2 473.6 2.3% 625.2 0.2% 2 740.2 2.5% 
Belgium 315.9 0.1% 5 633.0 5.3% 411.6 0.1% 2 149.1 1.9% 
China 187.5 0.1% 6 016.1 5.7% 635.4 0.2% 6 946.1 6.3% 
Czech Rep. 729.5 0.2% 1 754.5 1.6% 691.6 0.2% 1 163.9 1.0% 
Slovakia 110.1 0.0% 112.9 0.1% 515.6 0.1% 247.2 0.2% 
Slovenia 19.4 0.0% 36.2 0.0% 14.1 0.0% 2.3 0.0% 
Source: NBRB 
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Appendix H 
Personal remittance inflows and outflows in Belarus in 2011 and 2012 
Table H1. Personal remittances in Belarus in 2011 and 2012  
Item 
Inflow Outflow 
2011 2012 % 2011 2012 % 
Personal remittances (1+2+3) 792,3 913,1 115,2 128,6 134,9 104,9 
1. “Net” compensation of 
employees(Compensation of employees 
less expenses related to border, seasonal, 
and other short-term workers) 
396,8 476,2 120,0 7,2 9,1 126,4 
1.1. Compensation of employees 495,1 569 114,9 12,4 15,9 128,2 
minus       
1.2. Taxes and social contributions 
related to employment of border, seasonal, 
and other short-term workers 
5,4 6,9 127,8 1,5 1,9 126,7 
1.3. Travel and transport related to 
employment of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers 
92,9 85,9 92,5 3,7 4,9 132,4 
2. Personal transfers 395,5 436,9 110,5 121,4 125,8 103,6 
2.1. Workers’ remittances 350,4 379,5 108,3 106,4 110,9 104,2 
2.2. Other transfers between households 45,1 57,4 127,3 15,0 14,9 99,3 
3. Capital transfers between households 0 0 0 0 0 0 
For information:Remittances volume 
(1.1+2.1) 845,5 948,5 112,2 118,8 126,8 106,7 
Source: NBRB 
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Appendix I 
Description of the data and results of the VAR models  
Table 11. Description of the variables 
Variable Indicator name Description 
lr_in_sa Remittances inflow in Belarus Natural logarithm of quarterly seasonally adjusted* index (2005=100) 
lgdp _sa GDP in Belarus Natural logarithm of quarterly seasonally adjusted index (2005=100) 
lreer _sa REER in Belarus Natural logarithm of quarterly seasonally adjusted index (2005=100) 
lcpi _sa CPI in Belarus Natural logarithm of quarterly seasonally adjusted index (2005=100) 
lGDPru_sa GDP in Russia Natural logarithm of quarterly seasonally adjusted index (2005=100) 
* - since the data are obtained quarterly we apply a 4-point moving average smoother to the data (using tssmooth ma 
command in Stata). Thus, for time 3, we obtain an average of the first 4 power load observations (we use the previous two, 
current, and first future measurements).  
Table 12. Variables’ descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lr_in_sa 33 5.81096 0.54505 4.78038 6.58332 
lgdp_sa 33 4.85331 0.15110 4.51470 5.03614 
lGDPru_sa 33 4.87019 0.08583 4.64727 4.98975 
lcpi_sa 33 5.05033 0.47089 4.56122 6.03061 
lreer_sa 33 4.63333 0.10373 4.38826 4.84655 
Table 13. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (data dependent lag) 
 
Variable Intercept Trend and Intercept None 
Remittances inflow (lr_in_sa) -0.881 -2.093 2.221** 
GDP in Belarus (lgdp _sa) -2.431 -0.597 1.089 
REER (lreer _sa) -1.216 -1.844 -0.399 
CPI (lcpi _sa) 0.360 -1.715 1.541 
GDP in Russia (lGDPru_sa) -0.771 -2.051 1.297 
Note. Number of lags = four 
* H0 of unit root is rejected at the 10 percent level 
** H0 of unit root is rejected at the 5 percent level 
*** H0 of unit root is rejected at the 1 percent level 
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Figure 11. Levels and first differences of remittances and other variables 
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Table 14. Pairwise correlations for Belarus and Russia GDP with 6 lags and remittances 
 
Variable (t) (t-1) (t-2) (t-3) (t-4) (t-5) (t-6) 
Belarusian GDP 0.5461 0.2748 0.2279 0.1242 0.1343 -0.0174 -0.1646 
 (0.0012) (0.1346) (0.2258) (0.5208) (0.4958) (0.9315) (0.4216) 
Russian GDP 0.5201 0.439 0.3704 0.3125 0.2062 0.0295 -0.1609 
 (0.0023) (0.0135) (0.0439) (0.0988) (0.2926) (0.8839) (0.4325) 
* All variables are de-trended. P-values in parentheses 
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Table 15. Pairwise correlations for remittances with 6 lags 
Variable (t) (t-1) (t-2) (t-3) (t-4) (t-5) (t-6) 
Belarusian GDP 0.5461 0.3504 0.0937 -0.1915 -0.3512 -0.3849 -0.3428 
 (0.0012) (0.0533) (0.6222) (0.3198) (0.0669) (0.0474) (0.0864) 
Russian GDP 0.5201 0.3663 -0.0118 -0.3571 -0.5142 -0.4409 -0.1954 
 (0.0023) (0.0427) (0.9505) (0.0572) (0.0051) (0.0214) (0.3387) 
REER 0.3197 0.1828 -0.1661 -0.3804 -0.3115 -0.1232 0.1721 
 (0.0744) (0.325) (0.3802) (0.0418) (0.1066) (0.5404) (0.4007) 
CPI 0.1793 0.1181 -0.1782 -0.389 -0.2766 -0.0104 0.1851 
 (0.3432) (0.5343) (0.3462) (0.037) (0.1542) (0.9589) (0.3654) 
* All variables are de-trended. P-values in parentheses 
Table 16. Vector autoregression results for Belarusian GDP and remittances 
Equation  VAR(2) VAR(3) 
lgdp_saD1 R-sq 0.5888  0.6046 
chi2 42.96279  44.33871 
P>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
lgdp_saD1 L1. 0.586*** 0.516* 
 (0.000) (0.013) 
L2. 0.312** 0.337 
 (0.003) (0.088) 
L3.  0.0787 
  (0.502) 
lr_in_saD1 L1.  0.0330 0.0242 
 (0.165) (0.317) 
L2. -0.0644** -0.0404 
 (0.005) (0.156) 
L3.  -0.0368 
  (0.163) 
Constant 0.00207 0.00266 
 (0.397) (0.303) 
lr_in_saD1 R-sq 0.4731  0.5739  
chi2 26.93177  39.05193  
P>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
lgdp_saD1 L1. 1.078 0.0327 
 (0.392) (0.983) 
L2. 1.079 1.434 
 (0.181) (0.315) 
L3.  1.217 
  (0.151) 
lr_in_saD1 L1.  0.700*** 0.584*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
L2. -0.416* -0.0961 
 (0.021) (0.641) 
L3.  -0.498** 
  (0.009) 
Constant 0.00557 0.0123 
 (0.769) (0.512) 
SBIC -8.926249 -8.605531 
AIC  -9.393315 -9.265605 
HQIC  -9.243896 -9.058878 
N 30 29 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 12. Orthogonalized impulse response graphs from VAR(2) model for remittances and 
Belarusian GDP  
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Figure 13. Cholesky forecast error variance decompositions from VAR(2) model for remittances 
and Belarusian GDP  
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Table 17. Variance decompositions of remittances (%) 
Horizon Remittances Belarusian GDP 
1 100 0 
2 98.86 1.14 
3 93.45 6.55 
4 87.94 12.06 
5 84.69 15.31 
6 83.10 16.90 
7 82.30 17.70 
8 81.86 18.14 
Table 18. Vector autoregression results for Belarusian and Russian GDP and remittances 
Sample: 2005q4 - 2013q1 No. of obs = 30 
Log likelihood = 272.5164 AIC = -16.76776 
FPE = 1.08e-11 HQIC = -16.45398 
Det(Sigma_ml) = 2.58e-12 SBIC = -15.78692 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
lr_in_saD1 7 .061565 0.5052 30.62794 0.0000 
lgdp_saD1 7 .007332 0.6683 60.44803 0.0000 
lGDPru_saD1 7 .00556 0.8659 193.683 0.0000 
   
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lr_in_saD1  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .6383436 .185615 3.44 0.001 .2745449 1.002142 
L2. -.3825196 .1822287 -2.10 0.036 -.7396813 -.025358 
lgdp_saD1  
L1. .4602775 1.346857 0.34 0.733 -2.179513 3.100068 
L2. .82751 .909745 0.91 0.363 -.9555575 2.610578 
lGDPru_saD1  
L1. 1.770751 1.5127 1.17 0.242 -1.194086 4.735589 
L2. -.6111036 1.579907 -0.39 0.699 -3.707664 2.485457 
cons .0101528 .0195793 0.52 0.604 -.0282219 .0485275 
   
lgdp_saD1  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .0179071 .0221048 0.81 0.418 -.0254174 .0612317 
L2. -.0537181 .0217015 -2.48 0.013 -.0962522 -.011184 
lgdp_saD1  
L1. .471314 .1603962 2.94 0.003 .1569431 .7856848 
L2. .2835341 .1083409 2.62 0.009 .0711898 .4958784 
lGDPru_saD1  
L1. .4506452 .1801464 2.50 0.012 .0975647 .8037257 
L2. -.2366928 .18815 -1.26 0.208 -.60546 .1320745 
cons .0027121 .0023317 1.16 0.245 -.0018579 .0072822 
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lGDPru_saD1  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .0079317 .016762 0.47 0.636 -.0249211 .0407846 
L2. -.0470117 .0164562 -2.86 0.004 -.0792652 -.0147582 
lgdp_saD1  
L1. -.0062789 .1216279 -0.05 0.959 -.2446651 .2321073 
L2. -.0604623 .0821545 -0.74 0.462 -.2214822 .1005576 
lGDPru_saD1  
L1. 1.229902 .1366044 9.00 0.000 .9621625 1.497642 
L2. -.3304881 .1426734 -2.32 0.021 -.6101229 -.0508533 
cons .0043551 .0017681 2.46 0.014 .0008897 .0078205 
Table 19. Variance decompositions of remittances in VAR model including Russian GDP (%) 
Horizon Remittances Belarusian GDP Russian GDP 
1 100 0 0 
2 98.33 0.03 1.64 
3 93.57 0.71 5.71 
4 89.09 1.05 9.86 
5 87.02 1.01 11.97 
6 86.46 0.99 12.55 
7 86.34 1.16 12.51 
8 86.18 1.43 12.40 
Figure 14. Impulse response graphs (top row) and variation decomposition (bottom row) for 
VAR(2) model including Russian GDP  
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Figure 15. Orthogonalized impulse response graphs from VAR(2)  
model for remittances and REER 
 
-.05
0
.05
.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
varbasic, lr_in_saD1, lr_in_saD1 varbasic, lr_in_saD1, lreer_saD1
varbasic, lreer_saD1, lr_in_saD1 varbasic, lreer_saD1, lreer_saD1
95% CI orthogonalized irf
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
 
-.05
0
.05
.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
varbasic, lcpi_saD3, lcpi_saD3 varbasic, lcpi_saD3, lr_in_saD1 varbasic, lcpi_saD3, lreer_saD1
varbasic, lr_in_saD1, lcpi_saD3 varbasic, lr_in_saD1, lr_in_saD1 varbasic, lr_in_saD1, lreer_saD1
varbasic, lreer_saD1, lcpi_saD3 varbasic, lreer_saD1, lr_in_saD1 varbasic, lreer_saD1, lreer_saD1
95% CI orthogonalized irf
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
 
Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Belarus 
CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 71 
Table I10. Vector autoregression results for remittances, REER and CPI 
 
Sample: 2006q2 - 2013q1   No. of obs = 28 
Log likelihood = 166.9429   AIC = -10.42449 
FPE = 6.16e-09   HQIC = -10.11904 
Det(Sigma_ml) = 1.33e-09   SBIC = -9.425341 
 
Equation Parms RMSE  R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
lr_in_saD1 7 .062184 0.5347  32.18045 0.0000 
lreer_saD1 7 .058223 0.2327  8.491287 0.2043 
lcpi_saD3 7 .017116 0.3905  17.93792 0.0064 
    
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lr_in_saD1  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .8090569 .1731821 4.67 0.000 .4696262 1.148488 
L2. -.2991949 .163686 -1.83 0.068 -.6200137 .0216239 
lreer_saD1  
L1. .2949543 .2485042 1.19 0.235 -.192105 .7820137 
L2. -.491741 .24366   -2.02 0.044 -.9693058 -.0141761 
lcpi_saD3  
L1. .0067816 .8105782 0.01 0.993 -1.581923 1.595486 
L2. .739752 .7647738 0.97 0.333 -.7591772 2.238681 
cons .0240994 .0144431 1.67 0.095 -.0042086 .0524074 
     
lreer_saD1  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .3124786 .1621503 1.93 0.054 -.0053301 .6302873 
L2. -.319477 .1532591 -2.08 0.037 -.6198594 -.0190946 
lreer_saD1  
L1. .0824443 .2326744 0.35 0.723 -.3735891 .5384777 
L2. .1018768 .2281387 0.45 0.655 -.3452669 .5490205 
lcpi_saD3  
L1. .0239293 .7589439 0.03 0.975 -1.463573 1.511432 
L2. -.9042917 .7160573 -1.26 0.207 -2.307738 .4991548 
cons -.0026741 .0135231 -0.20 0.843 -.0291788 .0238307 
     
lcpi_saD3  
lr_in_saD1  
L1. .0476124 .0476689 1.00 0.318 -.0458169 .1410417 
L2. -.1019799 .0450551 -2.26 0.024 -.1902862 -.0136736 
lreer_saD1  
L1. .0818408 .0684015 1.20 0.232 -.0522238 .2159053 
L2. .1256583 .0670682 1.87 0.061 -.0057928 .2571095 
lcpi_saD3  
L1. .1468484 .2231141 0.66 0.510 -.2904472 .584144 
L2. -.474575 .2105063 -2.25 0.024 -.8871597 -.0619902 
cons .0025081 .0039755 0.63 0.528 -.0052837 .0103 
Uladzimir Valetka 
72 CARIM-East RR 2013/42 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
Appendix J 
Remittances inflows and cash foreign exchange sales by households 
Figure J1. Remittances inflows and cash foreign exchange sales by households, mln. USD 
 
Source: NBRB data 
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Appendix K 
The share of the service sector in Belarusian GDP 
Figure K1. The share of the service sector in Belarusian GDP, % 
 
Source: Belstat 
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Appendix L 
Average wage dynamics in Belarus in 2005-2012 
Figure L1. Nominal and real gross average monthly wages in Belarus in 2005-2012, USD 
 
Source: Simon Kuznets Research Center (www.kuznetscenter.ekonomika.by) 
Figure L2. The ratio of minimum wage to average wage (Kaitz index) in Belarus in 2006-2011 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on Belstat monthly data. 
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Appendix M 
Remittances and housing sector development  
Figure M1.Volume of remittances and number of individuals (families) that improved their 
housing conditions in 2000-2011 
 
Source: NBRB and Belstat data 
Figure M2. The dynamics of remittances and housing stock (millions of square metres of total 
floor space) in 2000-2011 
 
Source: NBRB and Belstat data 
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Appendix N 
Households’ savings in foreign and national currency in 2005-2012  
Figure N1.Growing gap in household savings in foreign and national currency in 2005-2012, 
BYR bln 
 
Source: NBRB 
Figure N2. Household savings in national (BYR bln) and foreign currency (USD mln)  
in 2005-2012 
 
Source: NBRB monthly data 
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Appendix O 
Effects of remittances: predictions from labour supply model of immigration  
The simple labour supply model of immigration suggests that the source country suffers, ceteris 
paribus, a decline in total production but enjoys a rise in per capita income after immigrants depart. 
Figure O1 illustrates that the leftward shift in labour supply causes wages in the source country to rise 
from A to Bf or the remaining workers. As a result, immigration increases total wages accruing to the 
remaining workers from the area f to f + e in the source country. On the other hand, the income 
accruing to the economy’s other factors declines from d + e + g to just d. The size of the source 
country economy shrinks by the areas g + h that lie between the original and post-immigration labour 
supply curves S and S’ and under the fixed value of the marginal product of labour, or labour demand, 
curve. The effect of immigration on the source country is a mixed result, with per capita total income 
rising, the size of the economy shrinking, and some groups gaining at the expense of others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure O1. Immigration’s effect on labour markets  
Source: Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009. 
The simple labour supply model of immigration is incomplete, however. First of all, the departure 
of a substantial number of workers implies that there are fewer consumers living in the source country, 
and the total income of that reduced number of consumers is also lower by the areas g + h. All things 
being equal, immigration reduces labour demand in the source country. 
In the real world trade is not costless. Many goods and services are still “non-tradables”. Thus, the 
movement of people from one country to another also shifts some demand from one economy to 
another. The conclusions from the basic labour supply model of immigration, therefore, must be 
modified as suggested in Figure O2: when immigrants depart from the country, total output and 
income fall, the demand for labour declines from VMP1 to VMP2 (VMP stands for the ‘‘value of the 
marginal product’’ of labour). The wage thus rises only to C, not all the way to B as in Figure O1. 
Immigrant remittances (R) shift income, and thus labour demand, from the destination country to 
the source country. In fact, if immigrants remit a substantial enough portion of their higher destination 
country incomes to the source country, then total demand for labour in the source country could 
actually increase even though people leave the country. 
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If remittances exceed the loss in income due to the shrinking of the economy after the departure of 
immigrants (R>g+h), the demand curve for labour could on balance shift upward rather than 
downward (Figure O2).  
Figure O2. Immigration and demand for labour in the source country with remittances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009. 
Figure O2 shows two different scenarios in the source country for labour demand following 
emigration. In the absence of remittances, labour demand falls from VMP1 to VMP2, causing wages 
to fall from B to C. With remittances, labour demand rises from VMP1 to VMP3, causing wages to 
rise to D. Note, however, that a fraction of income remitted back to the source country must be 
sufficiently high for wages to rise, especially when one destination country dominates the labour 
migration landscape. 
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Appendix P 
Objectives and measures of remittance facilitation policy 
Table P1. Specific objectives and measures of remittance facilitation policy 
Intermediate objectives Specific objectives Examples of measures 
Increase the volume of current 
remittances 
Maximizing the volume of 
remittances sent from abroad 
Minimizing the depletion of 
remittances by transfer costs 
Increasing financial returns to 
remittance deposits 
Diverting a proportion of 
remittances to be used by the 
state 
Promoting short-term labour 
migration 
Low barriers to market entry for 
transfer service providers 
Foreign currency accounts with 
premium interest rates 
Direct taxation of remittance 
transfers 
Promote the channeling of 
remittances directly to 
development purposes 
Promoting donations by 
remittance senders 
Stimulating development 
financing by hometown 
associations (HTAs) 
Outreach through the 
infrastructure of microfinance 
institutions 
Voluntary check-off for 
charitable donations on transfer 
forms 
Matched funding for HTAs 
Small-scale credit for remittance 
receivers 
Stimulate direct investment of 
remittances 
Outreach through migrants’ 
service bureaus  
SME schemes (financial, 
infrastructural, or innovative) 
One-stop-shop for emigrant 
investors  
Tax break on imports of capital 
goods 
Stimulate indirect investment of 
remittances 
Promoting transfers through 
financial institutions 
Increasing financial returns to 
remittance deposits 
Promoting consumption of local 
goods and services 
Cross-subsidization of transfer 
services by banks 
Foreign currency accounts with 
premium interest rates 
Tariffs on imported goods with 
locally produced alternatives 
Stimulate development-friendly 
consumption 
Enabling migrants to spend on 
their relatives' behalf 
Addressing the social impact of 
remittance fuelled business 
sectors 
Stimulating banking unbanked 
senders and receivers 
Health insurance for non-
migrants marketed to emigrants 
Surveillance of employment in 
the construction sector 
Cross-subsidization of transfer 
services by banks 
Stimulate sound management of 
remittances 
Promoting financial literacy 
among senders and receivers 
Promoting transfers through 
financial institutions 
Financial education 
programmes through 
community organizations  
Cross-subsidization of transfer 
services by banks 
Secure future remittances 
Promoting continued migration  
Promoting diaspora engagement 
Bilateral labour migration 
agreements  
Exchange programmes for 
children of emigrants 
Source: Carling (2007). 
